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MODERN RATIONALES OF ESCHEAT
Although the principle of escheat is as ancient as the feudal law of
tenures, in recent years it has experienced a rapid expansion as legislators
and administrative officials awaken to its revenue possibilities. However,
the rationales of modern escheat have received little exposition or clarifica-
tion, and some authorities have confused modern escheat policies with their
feudal predecessors. For example, a Pennsylvania' and an Oregon 2 case
each decided the issue of whether a county can impose its inheritance tax
on an estate which escheated to the state on the basis of whether the state
took the property as sovereign or as ultimate heir, and both concluded that
the state took as heir. However, they reached opposite results as to the
taxability of the property. The Pennsylvania case held that the property
was taxable, since the state as heir was subject to the same burdens as any
other heir,3 while the Oregon case found the estate not taxable because the
state took immediately as heir and public property is not taxable. Both
courts, in part due to their respective state laws, 4 failed to grapple with
the relevant considerations. The state takes property of those who die
intestate without heirs because there is no one else to whom it can go, but
when the county claims part of the estate in inheritance taxes, that portion
belongs to the county and is not truly ownerless. On the other hand,
property escheated by the state may ultimately benefit the county, and also
the county's powers are all delegated by the state; the nature of the state-
county relations may indicate that the county cannot tax property taken by
the state. In any event, the issue is very remote from the question of
whether or not medieval lords seized property as heirs.
In order to clarify the rationales of modern escheat, the first part of
this Note analyzes and evaluates the reasons for escheating property; the
second part surveys and organizes the myriad of escheat legislation, with
primary emphasis on the various types of property subject to escheat.
Since the questions of situs of intangibles and jurisdiction over them have
been left uncertain by the Supreme Court,5 and since these questions have
I Philadelphia v. Linton, 10 Pa. Dist. 329 (C.P. 1901).
2 State Land Bd. v. Ransom, 158 Ore. 197, 75 P.2d 6 (1938).
3 Compare In re Stack, 29 Luzerne L. Reg. 252 (Pa. C.P. 1934). The court
allowed county real estate taxes to be imposed on land taken by the state under a
custodial escheat statute until the land was permanently escheated, on the ground
that the land was not held for public purposes so long as heirs of the intestate could
claim it.
4 Although an Oregon statute specifically provided that title to property of the
intestate vests immediately in the state, the court discussed at length the theory that
the state is an heir.
5 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) ; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,
333 U.S. 541 (1948) ; Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
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been adequately covered elsewhere, 6 they are treated here only to the extent
that they bear directly on the main topic.
I. DEFINITION OF ESCHEAT
While no definition of "escheat" satisfies all authorities, they agree
that the term does not include every transfer of property to the state; at
least taxation, fines, eminent domain, and a gift or sale of property to the
state must be excluded. The term escheat does not include the taking of
property solely for purposes of state revenue, punishment of the owner
when no particular property is specified, or the seizure of specific property
solely for state use when the identity of the owner is irrelevant. In addi-
tion, escheat excludes the transfer of property to the state when the state
has no power to take it by judicial or administrative proceeding, as in the
case of a voluntary gift to the state.7 Two additional problems-whether
the term includes statutes transferring possession but not title to the state,
3
and whether statutes providing for the confiscation of property which is
not ownerless or presumed ownerless are properly designated as escheat
acts 9 -will be discussed. For the present, however, escheat may be defined
as seizure by the state of property which has no owner.
II. RATIONALES
A. No Reasonable Claimant
When property is ownerless and no one could reasonably take it,
escheat is clearly justified; the most common example is the estate of a
person dying intestate and without heirs."0 While there are numerous
rationales to justify escheat in these situations," the best is that no reason-
able alternative disposition has been proposed. Such situations are rare,
however, and in most cases some person or entity holds the property or has
a tenable claim to it. When such a claimant exists, some other rationale
for escheat is necessary.
6 See, e.g., Lane, Western Union v. Pennsylvania or Whose Mink Was Goredf,
18 Bus. LAw. 311 (1962); 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 484 (1962); 16 Sw. L.J. 660 (1962);
34 TEmp. L.Q. 164 (1961); 23 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1016 (1962).
7But see CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-14-14(3) (1953). Some statutes specifi-
cally impose on the attorney general, escheator, or other officer responsible for bringing
escheat proceedings a positive duty to bring such proceedings in all cases in which
property has escheated or is escheatable. Others even allow private persons to insti-
tute escheat actions or sue to compel the escheator to institute such actions. When
no duty to seize all escheated property is set forth, it has been held that the responsible
official may choose what property to escheat. State v. National State Bank, 44 N.J.
Super. 501, 130 A.2d 901 (Ch. 1957).
8 See text accompanying notes 16-20 infra.
9 See pp. 104-05 infra.
10 See note 102 infra.
11 The view that the state is the ultimate heir was criticized in 85 U. PA. L. REv.
109 (1936).
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B. Owner Protection
1. In General
The most significant rationale of modem escheat is that the state's
custody protects the owner.' 2 This applies only to statutes which permit
the true owner to reclaim the property from the state; such statutes are
called abandoned property acts or custodial statutes.13  Some of the cus-
todial statutes allow claims to be advanced at any time after the state
assumes custody,14 but others permit recovery only for a certain period
after transfer to the state ' 5-in effect, a statute of limitations on these
claims. A sharp distinction is often drawn between custodial and per-
manent escheat statutes; 16 this is influenced in part by the differing
historical origins of escheat and bona vacantia, and the belief that bona
vacantia is the predecessor of modern custodial statutes.17  However, the
only significant difference between common-law escheat and bona vacantia
is that the former applied to realty and the latter to personalty' 5s Except
for the protection rationale, permanent escheat and custodial statutes have
many rationales in common, and some custodial statutes, particularly those
12 See ARx. STAT. ANN. § 50-602 (Supp. 1961).
13 The escheator is often permitted to pay in his discretion claims he believes
are valid. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 504 (Supp. 1962). Only a few acts
give the owner no other remedy. Most statutes provide for a judicial or administrative
hearing when the claim has been disallowed by the escheator, in order to protect the
rights -of other possible claimants. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1189 (Supp. 1962).
The legislature can at any time provide an appropriation for the owner of escheated
property, and in practice permanently escheated property may be returned. See 16
Sw. L.J. 660, 661 n.5 (1962). Nevertheless, the legislature is highly unlikely to
return such property when the statute specifically provides that the owner may not
recover it. On the other hand, when a regular procedure is established for repayment
by the legislature, the legislature will probably pay any owners who appear. Thus,
such statutes are properly classed as custodial. A few statutes allow recovery only
upon a judicial determination. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 9:153 (Supp. 1962).
Some statutes allow the holder who paid the state to repay the owner and then
secure reimbursement from the state. He may merely acquire the rights against the
state of the person whom he pays, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 468(b) (1958),
or he may be absolutely entitled to compensation by the state whether or not the
person he has paid is the true owner. At least one statute, although relieving the
paying holder of liability, requires him to defend any suit by the owner and provides
for reimbursement by the state. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:34-53 (1963). Notice of the
proposed payment of claims may be required in order to protect the rights of the
true owner. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1187 (Supp. 1962).
14 See, e.g., N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 1406; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 443, 468(1958).
15 See, e.g., CAl.. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1430 (generally 5 years); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 37-28 (1952) (personal property; 2 years) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 91 (1958)
(want of heirs; 3 years), § 301 (1958) (unclaimed deposits; 10 years).
16 See Ely, Pennsylvania Escheat Laws: Proposals for Revision, 64 DicK. L. REv.
329, 331-32 (1960).
'7 See Comment, 29 RocKY MT. L. REv. 102, 103 (1956).
1 8 Another distinction is that the rule of strict construction of escheat statutes
is based upon the fact- that the true owner is permanently deprived of his property
under absolute escheat, and the rule is therefore inapplicable to custodial statutes.
State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 23 N.J. 38, 46, 127 A.2d 169, 173 (1956) (New
Jersey Custodial Escheat Act construed to cover all money obligations, not just those
specifically enumerated).
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with a statute of limitations, include distinctive features of permanent
escheat statutes. In addition, the practical effect of both types of statutes
is similar; only a small percentage of property taken under custodial statutes
is ever reclaimed,19 although some states reserve small funds for the
payment of claims.20 Therefore, both types of statutes are here included
in the term "escheat."
The state is obviously the safest custodian of property; with its vir-
tually unlimited taxing power, it is able to pay any claims.2 1 The custodial
statutes truly protect the owner if any income or increase in the value of
the property escheated is retained for the benefit of the owner. In a
period of rising market values or general inflation, this can best be accom-
plished by the retention of the property intact; conversely, in a period
of falling market values or deflation, the owner is best protected if the
state converts the property into cash. However, despite current inflation,
many statutes require the sale of the property escheated and the repayment
to the owner of the sale price of the property. 2 Also, the state's costs in
escheating the property and selling it are usually deducted from the proceeds
of the sale,23 and administration expenses of the fund may be deducted.
The owner will usually suffer when statutes provide that any increment
or interest on the escheated property, whether held intact or converted
into cash, shall be retained by the state.2 If no separate provision is made
for deduction of state costs, such interest may be viewed as covering the
administration expenses of the state, but interest on the property is a poor
measure of such expenses and usually represents profit to the state, un-
justified by the protection rationale.
In addition to possible pecuniary loss, escheat may present procedural
burdens to the reappearing owner.25 To recover his property, the owner
must at least prove his claim to an administrative official and often secure
a court judgment, or even successfully petition the governor and state legis-
lature.26 This is more difficult than recovery of the property from the
private holder who would retain the property in the absence of escheat.
Thus, the principal protection afforded by escheat is the security of the
19 In New York, in the fiscal year of 1961-1962, $12,646,972.45 was received and
only $573,938.35 was refunded. New York Abandoned Property Statement, April 1,
1961-March 31, 1962. In Virginia, only about 200 persons have reclaimed escheated
property. Letter From A. M. Rucker, Jr., Administrator of Virginia Unclaimed
Property Act, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Sept. 28, 1962.
20 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 49, § 23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962) (minimum
of $25,000 must be kept in "Warrants Escheat Fund" for payment of claims) ; TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 15 (Supp. 1962) (half of $100,000 "Escheat Ex-
pense and Reimbursement Fund").
21 See 5 ZOLLMANN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3548 (1936).
22 See, e.g., N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 1403; PA. STAT. ANN. tit 27, §§ 71-75
(1958).
23 See, e.g., N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 1403 (2).
24 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.33 (Supp. 1962); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAw
§ 1405; Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank v. State, 248 Wis. 410, 22 N.W.2d 156 (1946).
25 See statutes cited in notes 22-24 supra.
26 See note 13 supra.
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property in the hands of the state; if the property is virtually as safe in
the possession of the private holder, protection of the owner does not war-
rant a transfer to the state.
When the holder is a private individual, the state is dearly a better
custodian; an individual may become insolvent, negligently lose the prop-
erty, or misappropriate it32 The protection rationale is especially sig-
nificant in the escheat of unclaimed bankruptcy dividends, since assets are
presumably insecure in the hands of a person who has just gone through
bankruptcy. When the holder is a corporation or institution, however, the
question of whether the owner is helped by escheat depends upon the cir-
cumstances surrounding the particular kind of property involved. Insur-
ance of the property or regulation of the holder could afford the owner
protection without escheat. The ordinary corporation lacks both protective
features, and all statutes which provide for the escheat of unclaimed cor-
porate stock or dividends are therefore custodial. Public utilities are
strictly regulated and rarely become bankrupt, but funds held by them are
uninsured; escheat of such funds is not clearly warranted, but is probably
justified. Most property held by banks, trust companies, and safe deposit
companies, however, is protected. Although protection of the depositor was
formerly an important function of the numerous acts providing for the
seizure of long neglected bank accounts, today the federal government in-
sures most bank deposits,28 banks are protected against bankruptcy,29 and
most states require the preservation of dormant accounts3 0 Thus, although
the continued expansion of such acts can be predicted with confidence, they
are not rationally supported by a policy of owner protection.3 '
2. Prevention of Taking by Third Party
The owner may be protected because escheat prevents acquisition of
the property by someone else. For example, if the state does not escheat
unclaimed dividends of a dissolved corporation, they will be divided among
27 Even funds in the possession of a judicial or administrative organ of the state
or local government are safer if transferred to the appropriate escheat fund, since
such funds are susceptible to personal appropriation or loss by dishonest or negligent
officials, particularly if held by a single person, such as a court clerk or sheriff. See
Lamberton Estate, 352 Pa. 531, 43 A.2d 94 (1945); Rosenfeld's Appeal, 337 Pa. 183,
10 A.2d 570 (1940).
28 See 64 Stat 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1958), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1812-28 (Supp. IV, 1963).
29 This is accomplished by means of strict regulation of banks. See generally
Pennsylvania Banking Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 819-1 to -1603 (1939), as
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 819-2 to -1506 (Supp. 1962).
30A Texas provision, for example, prohibits the bank from transferring any
dormant deposit to its profit or asset account so long as the deposit remains dormant.
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b, § 2 (Supp. 1962).
SlBut see Anderson Natl Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Provident
Institution for Say. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911) ; Umbsen v. Crocker First Nat'l
Bank, 203 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1949) ; Taylor v. Western States Land & Mortgage Co., 77
Cal. App. 2d 869, 874-75, 176 P.2d 975, 978 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947) ; Union Trust Co. v.
Commonwealth, 359 Pa. 363, 375-76, 59 A.2d 154, 160-61 (1948).
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the stockholders who appear, since the corporation no longer exists.3 2
Likewise, if the funds held for unredeemed cemetery certificates are not
escheated, they must be paid to the certificate owners who appear, since
the cemetery corporation ordinarily is dissolved when the certificates are
called for redemption.P But there is a high probability that some missing
owners will appear later. The purchaser of a cemetery certificate is
primarily interested in obtaining a family cemetery lot and only secondarily,
if at all, concerned about making an investment. Therefore, he is unlikely
to have any contact with the cemetery corporation until a death occurs in
the family.
3. Notice-Procedural Due Process
Protection of the owner is also ensured by the notice requirements that
must be complied with before the property can be taken; the notice may
reach the owner and thus remind him of forgotten assets.3 4 The notice
required by the various statutes includes mailing to the last known address
of the owner,3 5 publication,3 6 and posting.3 7  The notice problems are
similar to those in any in rem proceeding, such as attachment or garnish-
ment. In the case of absolute escheat, procedural due process usually re-
quires mailing to the last known address3 8 The due process requirements
for custodial statutes are less strict, and very minimal notice, such as posting
on the courthouse door, has been upheld.3 9 However, a statute may require
notice to the owner without providing for escheat. For example, a Mis-
souri statute requires periodic notice by banks to the depositors of dormant
32 Cf. Mayer v. Chase Nat'1 Bank, 165 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (share of
unknown bondholders in judgment recovered by trustee escheats to state because
known bondholders have no interest in such shares). Compare notes 42-43 infra
and accompanying text.
33 See text accompanying notes 157-58 infra.
34 In California, for example, "newspaper publication has resulted in considerable
response, either directly from the owner or from persons knowing the owner. In
addition to . . . [the state's] efforts, there are numerous private investigators who
make a business of locating owners and contracting with them for recovery of property."
Letter From S. J. Cord, Chief of Division of Accounting, Controller of State of
California, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 11, 1962.
85 See, e.g., Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 393.110(2) (1962).
36 Publication is usually for two or three successive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the county where the property is located. The notice includes
the name and last known address of the owner, except in special circumstances. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §281 (1958). Often no notice need be published of a
fund less than a certain amount, unless it is in the interest of the owner or the state.
See, e.g., DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1183 (Supp. 1962) (minimum of $50) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 27, § 465 (c) (1958) (minimum of $50) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-242 (Supp.
1962) (minimum of $50). If the minimum amount is less than, or equal to, the cost
of publication, the lack of notice clearly does not violate procedural due process.
However, publication probably costs less than $50 for one unclaimed fund, and thus
the statutes may be unconstitutional.
'3See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-24 (1960) (notice on county courthouse door).
3See Application of People, 138 F. Supp. 661, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Cf. Walker
v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (condemnation proceeding).
39 Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 243-46 (1944).
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bank accounts, but contains no escheat provision. 40 On the other hand,
the holder may be more diligent in his efforts to locate the absent owner
when the state will take the funds if he fails.
4 '
C. Unjust Enrichment
Another rationale is that escheat prevents unjust enrichment or wind-
falls. However, the doctrine of unjust enrichment generally demands the
relinquishment of property wrongfully acquired or of property to which
another has a superior right. The continued possession of rightfully ac-
quired property when the owner cannot be found does not fit the usual
concept. Thus, the retention of unclaimed funds could be treated as one
of the benefits of the holder's business; such amounts enhance the holder's
profits and might be reflected in lower rates to the public or higher dividends
or interest to stockholders or other owners who do not abandon their
property. For example, if insurance companies were permitted to retain
unclaimed proceeds of policies, they could charge lower premiums. On the
other hand, the companies might fail to reduce premiums appreciably and
retain the unclaimed funds as profits.42 If unclaimed telegraphic money
orders were not escheated, Western Union might reduce its rates and thus
effect a saving to those more careful with their money. However, the rates
are already very low, and such abandoned money, if not escheated, would
probably become part of earned surplus rather than a current expense fund.
Thus the ultimate combatants here are the state and the stockholders, and
there is no particular reason why the latter should benefit instead of the
general public.
Nevertheless, even when there is no affirmative reason to let the holder
keep the abandoned property, he should not be deprived of it solely because
otherwise he will get "something for nothing." 43 The windfall argument
justifies escheat only when the holder has committed some wrong or done
something against public policy, or when escheat will encourage the holder
to act more in the owner's interest. For example, a public utility could
successfully refuse to perform part of its contract with a missing consumer
if the state did not escheat unclaimed deposits for services never rendered,
and could charge excessive rates with some degree of impunity if the state
failed to seize unclaimed overcharges ordered refunded. Escheat of un-
40 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 362.390-95, 363.650-60 (1952) (banks and trust companies);
see Tzx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b, §§ 3-4 (Supp. 1962) (depository to keep
dormant bank accounts for safe-keeping and advertise annually if not escheated by
state).
41 See p. 102 infra.
42 The windfall theory has been urged as the basis of statutes providing for the
escheat of insurance proceeds. See 58 YALE L.J. 628, 634-35 (1949).
43 The greater importance of the revenue and safe custody rationales can be seen
in provisions that the state will not escheat ownerless property with a value less
than a given amount See VT. STAT. ANN. tit 8, §§ 861-63 (1958) (bank may transfer
unclaimed bank accounts of less than $5 to its profit account). If the state were pri-
marily interested in preventing windfalls, it would escheat such property, although
the escheat would benefit neither state nor owner.
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claimed gambling proceeds is justified by the public policy against gambling
of almost all states.44 Certain types of gambling, particularly horse
racing, are permitted in a number of states only because they constitute a
lucrative source of tax revenue. Thus, insofar as the public interest is con-
cerned, the raison d'Otre of allowing gambling is to raise revenue for the
state; it is therefore desirable that the state endeavor to take a large share
of the gambling proceeds. The gambling operator, who is permitted to
perform socially undesirable acts primarily for the purpose of enhancing the
state's revenue, should not be able to retain funds due another when sought
by the state. Even when retention of the property by the holder violates
no policy of the state, the threat of escheat may induce the holders to attempt
to find the owner, particularly when the owner might desire to leave his
property-such as bank deposits-with the holders. Also, in the absence
of escheat, certain holders might tend to extract larger sums from owners
in the hope that they will never claim them. For example, public utility
companies might demand higher deposits, corporations might deduct larger
amounts from employees' salaries for the purchase of savings bonds, and
pledgees might require greater security in the expectation that the depositor
or debtor might disappear.
D. Commerce
Still another rationale of escheat is that it prevents the disuse of prop-
erty and returns it to commerce. This rationale applies only if the property
is inactive in the hands of the holder, and therefore is important in very
few cases, for example, bailments, particularly safe-deposit box rentals.
Most funds subject to escheat statutes constitute either trusts or debts, and
in both cases the funds are invested while held by the trustee or debtor.
E. Revenue
1. In General
Probably the most controversial rationale is that escheat obtains reve-
nue for the state. This is generally the foremost concern of legislators, al-
though often unexpressed in statements of policy.45 The importance of this
rationale varies with the different types of escheat statutes. When the
holder is unlikely to abandon certain property, the state gains little revenue
from an escheat statute. For example, the amount recovered by the escheat
of fiduciary funds is undoubtedly small, except in cases where the holder
is a trustee in bankruptcy or on the dissolution of a corporation. The will
or deed of trust often provides for distribution of the principal or interest
44 Cf. Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947) (plaintiff's
claim for share of gambling proceeds from brother's estate disallowed).
45 See Garrison, Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects,
35 Ky. L.J. 302, 314-17 (1947); Note, 65 HAv. L. REv. 1408 (1952).
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in the event that the beneficiary cannot or will not take. There are usually
very few beneficiaries as compared, for example, with the number of
depositors in a bank, or shareholders and creditors of a bankrupt corpora-
tion. In addition, the relationship between a trustee and beneficiaries is
such that the trustee is unlikely to lose track of them, and a trustee has a
higher duty than the ordinary holder to try to find the owner. On the other
hand, bank accounts and insurance proceeds constitute very lucrative
sources of escheat revenue,46 since a large number of these funds are
abandoned. The average bank depositor or insurance policyholder is not
likely to have any special business acumen and may forget about his prop-
erty; also the amount of individual bank deposits is likely to be small.
Usually very little property is found in safe deposit boxes,47 since the
depositor of valuable property less frequently forgets about his deposit
and often has an account in the bank against which the box rentals may
be charged.
The revenue rationale has merit to the extent that it represents a desire
to use abandoned or ownerless property for the common good rather than
leave it with whoever may happen to possess it.48 In almost every state,
most escheated property is deposited in the common school fund; 49 some-
times such property is used for the community where the property is located
or the holder resides.50
46 In many states dormant bank deposits constitute the largest single source of
escheated property. In California, $1,641,161.53 out of a total escheat of $3,844,797.38
was derived from unclaimed deposits in banking and financial organizations, including
certified checks, trust deposits, etc. Statement of Receipts, Disbursements and Cash
Balance-Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 1961-62 Fiscal Year. In
Hawaii, of a total escheat of $19,505 for the fiscal year 1961-1962, inactive bank deposits
provided $18,062. Letter From Nane A. Aluli, Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii,
to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 16, 1962. New York received
$9,337,148.37 from banks out of a total escheat of $12,626,972.45 for the fiscal year
1961-1962, although this figure is about $8,000,000.00 higher than for the average year
due to the shortening of the dormancy period by statute. Letter From J. J Mullens,
Assistant Director, Department of Audit and Control of New York, to the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct 4, 1962. In Nevada, most seized property is
apparently abandoned bank accounts. See Letter From Francis P. Finnegan, Legal
Research Assistant, Department of Attorney General of Nevada, to the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct 18, 1962. In Virginia, the "vast majority" of
amounts received consists of dormant bank accounts. Letter From A. M. Rucker,
Jr., Administrator of Unclaimed Property Act of Virginia, to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Sept 28, 1962.
47 See State v. National State Bank, 44 N.J. Super. 501, 130 A.2d 901 (Ch. 1957)
(nothing of substantial value in safe deposit boxes opened by bank, although bank
had lien of over $3,500 for unpaid rentals).
48 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-602 (Supp. 1961); State v. United States Steel
Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 359-60, 126 A2d 168, 178 (1956).
49 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1002 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-2716
(1951); IowA CODE ANN. § 302.1(3) (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-902
(1949). In a few states escheated property is transferred to the general fund of
the state. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 29, § 46A (1961). In North
Carolina, all escheated property goes to the University of North Carolina. See
generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116-20 to -26 (1960).
50 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-24.1 (Supp. 1961) (escheated bank deposits go
into county welfare fund of county in which bank is located) ; MD. ANN. CODE art 46,
§ 47 (1957) (escheated land goes to city or county where land lies).
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2. Conflict with Other Policies
a. Statute of Limitations
A serious problem often created by escheat statutes which are based
upon the revenue rationale is interference-usually unintentional-with
other state laws or policies. Although the state succeeds only to the rights
of the owner who has presumptively abandoned his property or died
intestate without heirs,51 most escheat statutes 52 and judicial decisions 53
dealing with the statute of limitations have provided that the limitation
period on the owner's claim against the holder does not run against the
state. The majority hold that the statute of limitations gives the holder
no substantive right, and they argue that the purpose of the statute is to
protect the holder against spurious claims, i.e., loss of evidence by the
holder as to whether a claimant is the true owner. There is no reason to
apply the limitation period to the state, which is not seeking to prove its
ownership, but merely to take property which has not been claimed.54
The minority, however, view the statute of limitations as protecting the
holder against loss of evidence needed to prove that the holder himself
owns the property 5 5 as a defense against all claimants. Therefore, the
51 See State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 56 N.J. Super. 589, 604, 153 A.2d 691,
700 (App. Div. 1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 385, 157 A.2d 505 (1960).
52 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-23.1 (a) (1960).
53 See, e.g., Lamberton Estate, 352 Pa. 531, 43 A.2d 94 (1945).
54 See p. 96 mupra.55 New Jersey is the leading exponent of the minority rule. This view often
makes escheatability turn on whether the fund sought to be escheated is a trust or
a debt, since the statute of limitations does not apply to a trust. This is the sole
question in a comparatively vast amount of litigation engendered by the New
Jersey rule. See State v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 23 N.J. 259, 128 A.2d 861 (1957).
There is no good reason why trust property should be escheatable and debts should
not; escheatability should turn rather on a weighing of the various rationales. How-
ever, after the leading case of State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565
(1950), in which the statute of limitations was held to bar the escheat action, the
New Jersey legislature took various steps to prevent the statute from barring the
state. The period of dormancy was drastically reduced so that it was much shorter
than the period of limitations. The "primary purpose" of the Custodial Escheat Act
was to enable the state to possess unclaimed funds before the expiration of the period
of limitations. See State v. Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp., 35 N.J. 390, 393, 173
A.2d 290, 292 (1961). Of course, the statute of limitations itself is a legislative
creation, and the simplest course was to provide that it did not run against the state.
In State v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 29 N.J. Super. 116, 136-39, 101 A.2d 598,
609-10 (Ch. 1953), the New Jersey Superior Court upheld a scheme whereby the
statute of limitations ran against both the owner and the state until the end of the
dormancy period in the escheat statute. Then the state's cause of action to escheat
arose, and no statute of limitations applied to this cause of action. However, in
State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 353, 126 A.2d 168, 174 (1956), the
court said in dictum that the statute continued to run until an order to show cause
why the property should not escheat was served on the holder; this implies that the
state's cause of action does not automatically accrue. Nevertheless, this should
present little problem for the state in the enforcement of its escheat statutes, because
the court held that the holder's failure to report the unclaimed funds as required
by statute equitably estopped it from asserting the defense of the statute of limita-
tions. Id. at 359, 126 A.2d at 178. "Where, however, the bar [of the statute of
limitations] is used primarily as a sword rather than a shield and by one who has
been responsible to disclose the actionable essentials in the face of a duty to speak,
factors of vicarious enrichment become a dominant consideration which we are prone
to remedy in equity and good conscience." Ibid.
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statute should run against the state, which can take only ownerless
property. However, in many types of escheat the holder almost invariably
has no tenable claim to the property. For example, a reasonable claim by
a trust company to the beneficial interest in trust funds in its hands is
virtually inconceivable, and under either the majority or minority view
the trust company would not be injured by escheat after the statute has
run against the owner. Thus, except when the holder could have a valid
claim to the property and the minority view prevails, permanent escheat
does not conflict with the statute of limitations.
Custodial escheat conflicts with this policy, however, under either
majority or minority view, if claimants are permitted to recover the
escheated property from the state after the limitation period has expired.
The policy of the statute of limitations demands that the period run against
the owner despite escheat, since the dangers of loss of evidence as to the
identity of the true owner are magnified by the fact that state officials have
no first-hand knowledge of the holder's obligation. Furthermore, when
the statute has run prior to the state's taking, custodial escheat will produce
unreasonable distinctions between various owners because obviously prop-
erty can escheat only if the owner is missing at the time of transfer to the
state. Thus, the owner who vanishes and then reappears after the statute
has run but before the property has escheated-perhaps because he received
notice of the proposed escheat-is in a worse position than the owner who
has not received actual notice of the escheat proceeding and does not appear
until the property has escheated. Since the state is seldom able to prove
actual notice, he can deliberately keep out of sight until the property has
been taken by the state and then come forward and claim it. Also, spurious
claimants may find it worthwhile to wait until the state has seized the
property before pressing their claims, even though the holder is required
by many statutes to give the state all pertinent information relating to the
escheated fund. When the statute has run before escheat, recovery should
be denied to any claimant. However, this in effect converts the custodial
statute into a permanent escheat statute; and, when the sole rationale of
the escheat statute is owner protection, the statute of limitations should bar
escheat altogether, since owner protection can never support immediate
absolute escheat. When the statute of limitations has not run at the time
of transfer, escheat cannot be barred; but, regardless of the escheat statute's
rationale, a claimant's right to recover should terminate at the end of the
limitation period, even though the recovery period of the custodial statute
is longer.
b. Freedom of Contract
Another policy which escheat law may contradict is that of freedom
of contract. The holder of property otherwise subject to escheat may
provide by contract with the owner that if the property is unclaimed for a
certain period shorter than the statutory escheat period, the property shall
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belong to the holder.5 6  In State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co.,5 7 the
board of directors of the company had adopted a resolution providing that
every dividend unclaimed for three years reverted to the corporation; the
statutory escheat period was five years. The court said that the escheat
statute represented the public policy of the state to take unclaimed dividends
for the common good,58 that this public policy was part of the contract
between the corporation and its stockholders, and that the resolution was
contrary to public policy and therefore ultra vires.59 The court also ex-
pressed concern that the corporation and the state legislature might engage
in an "unseemly race" in which each would try to make its period shorter
than that adopted by the other. However, the court stresed the fact that
the sole purpose of the Jefferson Lake resolution was an attempt to avoid
escheat; 60 when a charter provides for reversion to the company for a valid
corporate purpose, the provision might be upheld, despite the resulting
circumvention of the escheat law."' By basing its holding on the intent to
evade the escheat law rather than on a public policy of protecting stock-
holders from contracts which provide for forfeiture of their dividends to the
corporation, the court ignored the protection rationale and strongly em-
phasized the revenue rationale. Since the statute in Jefferson Lake was
custodial, ignoring the protection rationale placed the shareholders in a
position analogous to that of an owner against whom the statute of limita-
tions has run. The holding apparently does not require the corporation
to pay a shareholder who reappears after the expiration of the company's
three-year period but before the property escheats, although the corporation
probably would do so. The stockholder who files a claim after the fifth
year can recover his dividend from the state and thus may be in a better
position than the shareholder who appeared earlier.
3. Moral Obligation
The revenue rationale more strongly justifies escheat when the missing
owner is morally indebted to the government for specific benefits received
without compensation. The clearest application of this rationale is found
in statutes providing for the escheat of funds held by state institutions for
56 See Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1408, 1409 (1952).
5t 36 N.J. 577, 178 A.2d 329, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 370 U.S. 158
(1962).
5
8 For a criticism of the court's reference to public policy, see 24 U. PxTT. L.
REv. 193 (1962).
59 This was an alternate holding; the court first held that there was no valid
contract with the stockholders providing that unclaimed dividends revert to the
corporation.
60 State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 36 NJ. 577, 591, 596, 178 A.2d 329, 336,
338 (1962).
61 See 38 NOTRE DamE LAw. 99 (1962). The writer suggests that in the case
of a valid contract between the corporation and the stockholders, escheat might
impair the obligation of the contract. Id. at 102.
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departed patients who did not fully pay for the services obtained. The
moral obligation is reflected in the provisions of some of the acts that the
funds escheated be used for the benefit of the particular institution that held
them; 62 that the unclaimed period is short, ranging from one 63 to three
years; 6 and that the statutes generally provide for absolute escheat after
a short period. A federal statute provides for the escheat of unclaimed
estates of veterans who die in veterans' homes intestate and without heirs.
65
The act is not fully justified by the moral obligation rationale, however,
since the right to live in a veteran's home may be considered part com-
pensation for services performed and an inducement to enlist. Also, the
act covers the veteran's entire estate, not just amounts deposited with the
home or received from the federal government, such as pensions.6 6 Never-
theless, Congress expected the escheated amounts to be small, since a
veteran with any financial means would be unlikely to enter a home.
67
More important than the moral obligation rationale is the protection of the
veteran's heirs; the federal statute is purely custodial, and thus their right
to recover is not cut off, as it might be under state statutes that would
apply in the absence of the federal statute. This is especially important
when the veteran has been sent by the government from his domicile to a
home in a distant state, since the heirs may not learn of his death until
years later and may be unfamiliar with the laws of the foreign state.
F. Undue Accumulations
Escheat is also said to prevent undue accumulations. Without escheat,
most unclaimed funds would be retained by the holder for the owner
indefinitely, and interest on the funds would be added to them. Although
the property is in commerce, no one is receiving any direct benefit from the
interest, and the state may be losing tax revenue otherwise derived from
the interest payments. These concerns, together with a desire to prevent
a decedent's "dead hand" from controlling the disposition of property long
after his death, have led to the Rule Against Perpetuities for private trusts
and the so-called "Thellusson" acts for charitable trusts. However, escheat
of the entire fund is not the only way to avoid undue accumulations. Heavy
taxation of the interest, for example, would restrict the fund's growth
without disturbing the principal. Escheat of only the interest on the
interest would leave the principal and the interest intact for the owner
while preventing undue accumulations.
62 See IoWA CODE ANN. § 218.68 (1949); Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.060 (1962);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-15-16 (1960).
63 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 965.08(4) (Supp. 1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-15-16
(1960) ; P-I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 40-2-11 (1956).
64 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, 8 45 (1957).
6572 Stat. 1259, 38 U.S.C. §§ 5220-28 (1958), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 5226
(Supp. III, 1962).
66 See 72 Stat. 1259, 38 U.S.C. § 5220(a) (1958).
67 87 CoNG. REc. 5202-04 (1941).
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1. Holder Protection
Escheat may be needed to relieve the holder of abandoned property
and release him from his duties in regard to it. Especially in the case of
funds in the hands of officers of the court, such as administrators of dece-
dents' estates and trustees in bankruptcy, escheat is a necessary alternative
to a wasteful and onerous duty to keep the estate open indefinitely.
G. State Security and Public Protection
1. In General
A frequent argument in favor of escheat is that it protects the state or
the public. A great variety of provisions manifest this rationale, but all
share the common feature that the property is not ownerless in fact but is
declared ownerless by operation of law. However, these statutes do not
specifically state that the property is ownerless, but merely provide for
confiscation by the state. This has led some writers to limit the term
"escheat" to the taking of property when the owner has abandoned it or
has died intestate without heirs, or when a presumption has arisen that
either event has occurred.
Neverthless, all authorities agree that the seizure of property because
the owner is in a class which is not permitted to own any or a certain kind
of property constitutes escheat. Feudal lords granted land to their subjects
for the purpose of obtaining their service and homage in return; thus the
courts held the fee subject to two implied conditions, and the breach of
either would cause the fee to revert to the original grantor, the lord. One
condition was that the ownership of the fee could not lapse so that there
was no one to render service to the lord. This condition was broken
upon the death of the owner without heirs capable of taking. Incapable
heirs included bastards, monsters, and aliens; they were incapable of taking
because they were considered unable to serve their lord. In medieval times,
the prohibition against inheritance by any alien was reasonable, since loyalty
to the sovereign was important to the welfare of the state and alliances with
other nations were usually temporary and for limited purposes. Today,
however, the rationales have changed; except for wartime emergency
measures, such as the Trading With the Enemy Act, the concern no longer
is the disloyalty of the alien. One present motive is to treat citizens of
another nation the same as that nation treats American citizens, 61 in order
to encourage foreign countries to allow inheritance and ownership by U.S.
citizens. Another purpose is to prevent property from going into nations
68 This is the rationale of the reciprocity statutes, which generally provide for
absolute escheat. However, a California court has applied the common-law rule that
when an -alien heir is disqualified his share passes into the residue of the estate and
escheats only if there is no other heir. Estate of Michaud, 53 Cal. App. 2d 835,
128 P.2d 595 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
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whose govermnents will probably confiscate it.69 This promotes the secu-
rity of the state and prevents the unjust enrichment of foreign governments.
The feudal rationale of service to the lord has vitality in a few rare
cases in which property is escheated because it is not being used for the
positive benefit of the state or the public. These are primarily cases in
which land is ceded by the state on the condition that the grantee make
some particular public use of it.
The second implied condition in a feudal grant of land was that the
owner remain loyal to the lord. This condition was breached upon con-
viction of treason or other felony. Such a conviction resulted in the attainder
or "corruption of the blood" of the offender, and he became an obstruction
in the chain of inheritance. This doctrine resembled the Saxon doctrine of
"forfeiture," by which the property of a convicted felon could be seized by
the Crown as part of his punishment. The United States Constitution has
alleviated the harsh effect of attainder on the traitor's heirs by prohibiting
forfeitures for treason except during the life of the person convicted.
70
Although the importance of forfeitures has greatly declined, the policy of
punishment or deterrence of criminals is still found occasionally. A few
statutes provide for the seizure of specific property illegally used. For
example, the purpose of an Ohio statute providing for the confiscation of
any device, such as a gun or trap, used to take wild animals in violation of
the game laws 71 is to prevent the illegal killing of such animals. The statute
is also intended to prevent future illegal killings by use of that device.
Acts which prohibit corporations or religious associations from holding
more real estate than is necessary for their business purposes have ancient
statutes as their models. Originally this type of statute was intended to
restrain the power of the Church. Modern rationales include the promotion
of land ownership by the occupant, the discouragement of land speculation,
the prevention of monopolies in land,72 and the avoidance of tax revenue
losses due to the extensive ownership of tax-exempt lands by religious
organizations. These policies are reflected in the fact that some of the
statutes apply only to rural or farm lands and some only to religious
associations.
73
The confiscation of property illegal per se, such as narcotics or
gambling devices, is generally not termed escheat. The policies in this
area are varied, and a treatment of them will not be attempted here.
2. Escheat From Third Parties of Property Which Is Not Ownerless
The force of the rationale of state and public protection is demonstrated
in instances in which escheatable property has been conveyed from the
69 See Sobko Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 76 (Orphans' Ct. 1954). The purpose of
these statutes is to protect the alien heirs, and such statutes are purely custodial. See
generally Chaitkdn, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites To Share
in Estates of American Decedents, 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 297 (1952).
70 U.S. CoNsT. art. IIL § 3.
71 OHIO RE . CoDE § 1531.13 (1954).
72 See MIss. CODE ANx. §§ 4088, 4108 (1956).
7 3 E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 273.090 (1962).
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incapable holder to an innocent third party before escheat proceedings
begin. In Texas Co. v. State ex rel. Coryell,7 4 the state unsuccessfully
sought to escheat land on the ground that the corporation which had sold
the land to the present owner had violated a state statute which forbade
corporations from holding such real estate. The court decided the case on
the basis of whether the land had been escheated or was merely escheatable
when the corporation took title,75 rather than looking to the policies behind
the escheat statute. In this case the court ruled in favor of the purchaser,
a result which lessens the effectiveness of the state policy prohibiting
corporations from holding real estate. Even if the title were only voidable,
the state could recover from the purchaser on a theory that he is not a bona
fide purchaser for value. He is charged with notice of the statute, and
therefore might be held to constructive knowledge that the corporation held
the land illegally. It might be reasonable to impose upon the purchaser
the burden of investigating the nature of the corporation, the nature of the
land, and the amount of land held by the corporation to determine whether
the statute is violated. However, if such an investigation would not reveal
the violation, he is a bona fide purchaser and should be allowed to keep the
property. He is nevertheless not injured if he can recover the purchase
price from the corporation. If the corporation's title was void, he un-
doubtedly has a cause of action against the corporation under the warranties
of title in the ordinary deed. Thus, he will be injured only if the corpora-
74 198 Okla. 565, 180 P.2d 631 (1947).
75 The majority held that the corporation had acquired a voidable title, but had
conveyed a good title to the owner, since title had not been voided by the state.
Id. at 570-71, 180 P.2d at 637. The minority contended that the statute prohibited
the acquisition of title as well as the holding of it, and that title passed directly to
the state upon the purported purchase by the corporation. Id. at 576, 180 P.2d at
643 (dissent). Therefore, the corporation had no title to convey to the purchaser.
The majority opinion appears to distort the terms of the statute by declaring, in effect,
that a corporation can acquire land although the statute specifically forbids it to do
so. Compare Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.300 (1962). That statute allows the state to
escheat the real estate of an alien only after the expiration of eight years from the
time he acquires title, and thus clearly permits him to acquire a title merely voidable
by the state after eight years. See also Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 271.145 (1962) (corpora-
tion can hold real estate for only five years).
However, both majority and minority in Texas Co. saw the issue as a technical
question of when title passes to the state. The various statutes and judicial decisions
differ as to whether the property escheats immediately upon the happening of the
event which gives rise to the state's claim to escheat, see IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2013
(1946) (legal title deemed to be in state from time of escheat), or only upon a
judicial or administrative judgment that the property is escheated, see ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 6, § 5 (1941) (title to lands subject to escheat because owned by aliens released,
provided that no proceedings begun to enforce escheat). Under the former view, the
judicial decision is that the property has escheated; under the latter, the property is
merely escheatable and the judicial determination is that the property is thereby
escheated. However, there is no procedural difference between the two views-some
action must be brought to transfer possession to the state in either case-, and there
is no substantive difference except when the owner has disposed of the property prior
to the escheat proceeding. A resolution of such a case should rest not on the theo-
retical question of when title passes to the state, but on a weighing of the two policies
involved. The court should seek to deter corporations from buying land while at
the same time protecting innocent purchasers. The minority in Texas Co. is in
harmony with the state policy to keep land out of corporate hands, while the majority
affords corporations a successful means to evade the statute. See 198 Okla. at 577,
180 P.2d at 643 (1947) (dissent).
[Voll2:95
MODERN RATIONALES OF ESCHEAT
tion is judgment-proof, although he is burdened with the expense and
trouble of two suits. A better procedure would be a direct punitive action
by the state against the corporation for a sum equivalent to the sale price
or value of the land when sold by the corporation, whichever is higher.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT PROPERTY BE OWNERLESS
The various escheat rationales are relevant only when the property is
ownerless; escheat of property which has an owner constitutes a deprivation
of property in violation of the fourteenth amendment, in the absence of a
valid statute prohibiting a particular type of owner from acquiring or hold-
ing a certain kind of property. The substantive due process issue turns on
the provisions of the statute involved, and the Supreme Court has deter-
mined the constitutionality of only a few types of provisions; 76 but, never-
theless, some general principles may be discerned. A state cannot take
property by absolute escheat without a judicial determination that the owner
has died intestate without qualified heirs or has abandoned the property,
except when property is declared ownerless by operation of law. These
determinations of fact may usually be made on the basis of statutory
presumptions 77 which shift the burden of going forward to the holder or
claimant. The substantive due process requirements for custodial statutes
are less strict; no judicial determination of fact is necessary, but there must
be a reasonable presumption of the fact that would be determined by a court
under an absolute escheat statute. The holder may assert the due process
rights of the true owner.
78
Every permanent escheat statute satisfies the judicial decision require-
ment either by expressly providing therefor or by limiting the applicability
of the statute to funds under the jurisdiction of a court.79 Thus, the
Pennsylvania provision for the escheat of trust funds, which applies only to
fiduciaries under the control of a court, and the statutes providing for the
escheat of unclaimed bankruptcy dividends or unclaimed assets of a dis-
solved corporation are undoubtedly constitutional. Since in the latter case
78 See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) ; Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321
U.S. 233 (1944).
77 See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b, § 7 (Supp. 1962) (owner of bank
account dormant for seven years presumed to have died intestate and without heirs) ;
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 220.25(2) (1957) (owner of bank account dormant for twenty
years presumed to have died intestate without heirs or to have abandoned it).
Expiration of the statutory unclaimed period gives rise to a presumption of death
or abandonment, but does not affect the substantive law of title to the property. See
State v. Phoenix Say. Bank & Trust Co., 60 Ariz. 138, 141-42, 132 P.2d 637, 639
(1942). Thus, the state must allege that the owner is unknown or unlocatable, not
merely that the property has remained unclaimed for the statutory period.
78The overwhelming majority of statutes relieve the holder of any liability to
the owner of the property after transfer to the state; so the holder cannot object to
escheat on the ground that a third party has a claim to the property. See, e.g., N.Y.
ABAND. PROP. LAW § 1404(2).
79 The intestacy escheat statutes satisfy due process, since the absence of heirs
is generally determined by a probate court in its regular proceedings. See IDAro
CODE ANN. § 15-1329 (1948).
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the bankruptcy court has control over the whole proceeding, the declara-
tion of abandonment is always by court order-even though escheat to the
state is often not considered a part of the dissolution or bankruptcy pro-
ceeding and the escheat action may be brought in another court.
Under almost all statutes, the presumption of abandonment appears
reasonable. This is especially so when the owner fails to fulfill an obliga-
tion to the holder as consideration for the return of the property held, and
the property is likely not to exceed greatly the amount of the payment. For
example, the presumption of abandonment of the contents of a safe deposit
box by a lessee who fails to pay the rent for a given period is reasonable,
since he probably considers the contents not worth the payment of rent.80
Likewise, the debtor who fails to pay his debt has probably abandoned the
collateral deliberately.
The reasonableness of the presumption of abandonment may depend
upon the length of the "unclaimed period," the specified period of time
during which the owner must be unknown or not located in order to give
rise to the presumption. This period varies greatly according to the type
of property involved. When the parties intend that property shall be
transferred to the owner very soon after an obligation becomes due or after
the holder and owner have entered their relationship, a short unclaimed
period is reasonable. For example, little time need elapse in order to give
rise to a reasonable presumption of abandonment of unclaimed pari-
mutuel winnings. Bets are almost always placed the day of the race, and
the bettor will know almost immediately whether money is due to him or
not. Thus, the most reasonable explanation for his failure to claim his
money is that he has deliberately abandoned it and not that he has forgotten
it or moved away. The shortness of the unclaimed period in a number of
bankruptcy and dissolution escheat statutes may be justified on several
grounds. The claimant is usually a businessman or other person who
might reasonably be expected to use sound business judgment in looking
after his financial affairs. Prolonged litigation is undesirable; courts are
generally anxious to terminate dissolution proceedings as rapidly as possible
and prevent the tieup of corporate funds for long periods.s ' Also, notice
of the proceeding is usually sent to creditors and shareholders at some stage
before notice of the final decree. On the other hand, most statutes providing
for the escheat of dormant bank accounts have adopted an unusually long
unclaimed period-a recognition of the fact that many depositors intend
their deposits to constitute a long term investment and consider their money
safe indefinitely in a bank. Nevertheless, no court has yet held an escheat
statute unconstitutional because the unclaimed period was too short to
support a presumption of abandonment, although the courts have indicated
that some unclaimed period must be provided in the statute.
so See note 47 supra and accompanying text
81 See Girard Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 367 Pa. 223, 231, 79 A.2d 666, 670
(1951).
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The presumption of abandonment may be unreasonable due to the time
at which the unclaimed period begins to run. For example, the period of
dormancy for public utility deposits and advance payments under the
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act runs from the time of
termination of services "for which the deposit or advance payment was
made." 8 2  The New York period runs from the same time, but when
services are rendered after that time and the deposit is held to secure pay-
ment for them, the period runs from the termination of such later services.
8 3
This added provision recognizes that a consumer who continues to receive
service would be unlikely to seek the return of his deposit even though the
service for which he made the deposit has expired. Thus, a deposit of a
subscriber who is still receiving utility service may be taken by the state
under the Uniform Act-a situation in which a presumption of abandon-
ment seems unreasonable.
Property owned by the holder is of course not ownerless, and escheat
of such property will violate the due process rights of the holder. In
State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,84 New Jersey unsuccessfully attempted
to seize a percentage of the proceeds from the sale of trading stamps; the
percentage represented a conservative estimate of the number of stamps
that would never be redeemed. A condition precedent to the redeemability
of the stamps was that complete books be filled with stamps. The purpose
of this requirement was to induce customers to buy more products from
the retailers in order to accumulate enough stamps to fill a book. The court
held that the state had the burden of proving that one individual had
aggregated enough stamps to fill one book before it could succeed to that
individual's redemption rights. The court properly refused to presume
that sufficient stamps had been gathered by any one consumer; it is more
likely that the stamps were not redeemed because the purchaser had not
yet received enough. The underlying, though unexpressed, basis of the
court's holding was that the funds were not ownerless, since the company
owns them until the book is filled. Thus, although the court based its
holdings on the statute, escheat of the redemption funds appears uncon-
stitutional.
The court required only that the state show a sufficient accumulation
of stamps,8 5 not that the stamps had actually been pasted in a book or
presented. The obvious purpose of requiring the customer to present the
stamps pasted in a book is to ensure that only the true owner is paid. The
state could never make such a presentation, since the very theory on which
it is proceeding is that no books have been presented for redemption; and
a requirement that it do so would enable any holder of otherwise escheatable
8 2 UN0FoR DisPosrrIoN OF UNCmAImED PROPERTY ACT § 4(a) [hereinafter cited
as UmFORM AcT].
83 N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAw § 400(1) (a).
84 49 N.J. Super. 165, 139 A.2d 463 (Ch. 1958); aff'd, 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153
A.2d 691 (App. Div. 1958), affd per curiarn, 31 N.J. 385, 157 A.2d 505 (1960).
85 49 N.J. Super. at 173, 139 A.2d at 467.
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property to avoid escheat by the simple expedient of requiring the pres-
entation of some paper in the possession of the owner as a condition
precedent to payment.
In Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,8 6 the United States
Supreme Court held that the New York statute which escheated unclaimed
life insurance proceeds did not impair the obligation of the contract between
the insurance company and the insured,8 7 even though the state did not
comply with the conditions precedent to recovery by the insured in the
policy.88 However, the status and condition of the insured are facts which
are not discoverable by the insurance company unless it can locate the
insured, but may constitute a defense to an action by the beneficiaries for
the proceeds of a policy.8 9 For example, the insured may have committed
suicide or died in some other manner not covered by the policy; if his
whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the company is unable to learn the
cause of his death. On the other hand, the statutory presumption that the
insured has died intestate without heirs could easily be extended to the
presumption that he has died a natural death intestate without heirs. How-
ever, as the number of presumptions increases, there is a corresponding
decrease in the probability that the overall presumption is correct. Never-
theless, one writer has expressed the opinion that the insurer is rarely
injured by the state's taking custody.90
In most cases, however, conditions precedent to recovery are imposed
by the holder in order to identify the owner, not provide knowledge of
possible defenses which the holder may assert. Thus it would be unrea-
sonable to require the state, which does not claim to be the owner, to
comply with these conditions. For example, the status of a depositor
would not affect the defenses which a bank might assert against the
depositor, and through him against the state.
IV. SURVEY OF ESCHEAT LEGISLATION
Modern escheat law bears only superficial resemblance to its hoary
ancestors; some of the rules are the same, but the underlying reasons have
necessarily changed. The old common-law escheat was an incident of
feudal tenure,91 and escheat occurred only when the owner of land died
intestate without capable heirs or when he was convicted of a felony or
86 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
871d. at 545-47.
88 Id. at 547. The court's reason for refusing to compel the state to comply with
the contract conditions was that it was acting as conservator of the property, not
as a party to the contract. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-23.1 (a) (1960) (state not
required to surrender policy or submit proofs of death).
89 One court held that the state has as against the policyholder any defense avail-
able to the company and as to other persons any defense available to the policyholder.
Barker v. Legett, 102 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Mo. 1951). However, if the insurance
company has a valid defense against the policyholder, the state cannot escheat the
fund in the first place.
90 See 58 YALE L.J. 628, 631-34 (1949).
91 See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *418.
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treason. Under no other circumstances would property escheat. Upon
the dissolution of a corporation, for example, the land did not escheat. It
reverted to the persons who had conveyed it to the corporation on a theory
similar to that underlying feudal escheat; the conveyance was subject to
the implied condition of the continued existence of the corporation.92
The doctrine of bona vacantia had an origin entirely independent of
escheat. According to this doctrine certain abandoned or unowned objects
were seized by the sovereign for his own use and benefit. The goods
subject to seizure were those which were either valuable or rare and thus
enhanced the king's revenues, or dignity; the finder was entitled to all
other abandoned property.
9 3
A. Current U.S. Statutes
Escheat to the lords was abolished in England by the Statute Quia
Emptores, and the Crown became the sole entity with the power to
escheat. 94  This power passed to the American states as part of their
sovereignty or police power, but the old rationales were gone. The absence
of a feudal system and the breakdown of the distinctions between land and
personalty in the laws of descent and distribution effected a merger of
common law escheat and bona vacantia into one doctrine, called "escheat,"
which became purely statutory.95 There is great variety in the kind and
extent of legislation in the various states. Some states have only a few
provisions for escheat in specific cases, usually common ones such as death
intestate without heirs.96 These states are declining in number as legisla-
tors become increasingly aware of the revenue potential of escheat. Recent
developments have included the extension of escheat to novel types of
property and the growth of the custodial statutes. Unfortunately states
frequently expand their escheat laws by adopting separate provisions in a
piecemeal fashion, often as a part of statutes covering various other topics.
Statutes may overlap and thus raise unnecessary problems. In Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, for example, the state may be empowered to take the
same property under either a custodial or an absolute escheat statute.97
Potentially escheatable property may not be covered by the express terms
of the statutes. To remedy this, some states have adopted only one general
provision that all abandoned or ownerless property shall escheat to the
92 See 2 id. at *256.
93 See 1 id. at *295-96; 7 HomswoRTH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 495-96
(1938).
94 See 3 id. at 72-73 (1909).
95 See Kennedy v. Gatz, 194 F. Supp. 795 (D. Alaska 1961).
96 Georgia is the most limited; it provides for escheat on the failure of heirs and
in no other case. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1101 (1935).
97 See State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 NJ. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956).
However, Pennsylvania has counteracted the overlapping to some extent by providing
that a particular provision shall be exclusive as to a certain kind of property. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 471 (1958) (unclaimed funds of life insurance companies).
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state.98  Such a statute plugs the loopholes, but raises other problems. No
test is provided to determine when the property is ownerless, and it is some-
times unclear what property the legislature intended to escheat. No
recognition is given to the unique circumstances of various types of property
and the need for different procedures in various cases. Furthermore, such
a general statute fails to focus the attention of the escheator on specific
kinds of property or to give certain holders notice that property in their
possession is subject to escheat. Other states have retained their piecemeal
legislation and in addition have enacted a catch-all provision,99 but the
problem of ad hoc legislation remains. The best solution is one compre-
hensive escheat act in a separate chapter of the state code. This would
include provisions applicable to all escheatable property and a catch-all
section. 0 0
B. Death Intestate Without Heirs
The oldest form of escheat, and the only circumstance producing
escheat in every state, is death intestate without heirs.1 0l Such escheat is
clearly warranted when there are no heirs in fact, since the state is the only
reasonable taker.'0 2 When the state is the only adverse party to a person
claiming to be an heir, the courts generally construe the escheat statutes
strictly and resolve any doubts in favor of the claimant.'0 3
98 See ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-603 to -604 (Supp. 1961) (escheat of all kinds of
personal property, tangible and intangible, if "abandoned" for seven years).
99 See ALASKA Com. LAws ANN. § 57-8-8 (1949).
"0 A good example of such a statute is Ky. Ray. STAT. §§ 393.010 to .990 (1962).
101 See, e.g., CoLo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 152-14-14 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.33
(Supp. 1962); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-1613 (1948); IowA CONST. art 9(2d), § 3
(1949); Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 393.020 (1962); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 170, § 1(VIII)
(1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 152 (1957) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.161 (Supp.
1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 480 (1942); NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 30-102(7) (1956).
102 However, the two most common theories advanced are that the state is the
reversioner, see In re Estate of O'Connor, 126 Neb. 182, 252 N.W. 826 (1934), and
that the state is the "ultimate heir" of the deceased, see Klein v. Brodbeck, 15 F.
Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1934). Several states also provide for escheat when the heir
or legatee fails to claim property to which he is entitled. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 15-1330 (1948); Ky. REv. STAT. § 393.020 (1962); Wis. STAT. § 318.03 (1961);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-688 (Supp. 1961). Thus, the lack of heirs may be due to the
fact that none exist or can be found, that they refuse to accept the property, or that
the heirs or legatees are not qualified to take. The four major rationales come into
play only when there is a holder; here there is no holder except the probate court
and its officers. However, some items in the estate, such as insurance proceeds, may
have a holder, and such property might be dealt with under specific statutes, rather
than under the intestate section. A distinction might be made between cases in which
it is proved that the deceased had no heirs and cases in which the deceased might
have heirs but they cannot be found. In the former situation, the property is truly
ownerless, while in the latter, there is merely a presumption that the heirs have
themselves died intestate without heirs or have abandoned their shares of the estate.
However, the special statutes are designed to apply to the abandonment of the
property by the person depositing it, not by his heirs. The heirs may never know
about the fund, and thus the presumption of abandonment may not be reasonable.
Therefore, it is reasonable to deal with the entire estate under the intestate escheat
statute, rather than under statutes for particular types of property.
103 See State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 355, 126 A.2d 168, 181
(1956). Intestacy escheat is much rarer today than at common law, since "con-
temporary intestate succession statutes are liberally drafted and construed." Note,
61 CoLu .L. Rav. 1319, 1321 (1961).
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Certain heirs, however, are incapable of taking property. Under some
statutes the share of the estate which an incapable heir would otherwise
receive will pass into the residue of the estate, and escheat operates only when
no other heirs exist. Thus, almost all states prohibit a murderer from
inheriting his victim's estate, and under all decisions and most statutes the
murderer's share passes as if he did not exist.' 14 Other statutes, however,
provide that the share of the incapable heir shall escheat to the state, not-
withstanding the existence of other capable heirs. Most statutes prohibiting
inheritance by aliens provide for the escheat of their shares, 1 5 although
most grant alien heirs a long period in which to dispose of the property
before escheat.' 0 6 The only rationale for the escheat of property otherwise
descending to aliens or murderers is the state's revenue, since they could as
easily be deemed to have predeceased the decedent, and thus their shares
would be distributed among the other heirs, as is commonly done under
most slayer's acts.
The old common-law rule against alien inheritance began to erode as
treaties between the United States and other nations provided that the
citizens of each signatory could inherit property from the citizens of the
other; 107 such treaties of course superseded all inconsistent state statutes.
08
Many states also repealed such statutes altogether 10 9 or introduced
reciprocity clauses permitting inheritance by any alien whose country
extended the same privilege to United States citizens." 0 These reciprocity
provisions are justifiable under the public protection rationale, since they
are designed primarily to protect American heirs of foreign estates by
encouraging other nations to let them inherit.
World War II led to statutes providing for the escheat of inheritances
of enemy aliens "' and gave rise to the first extensive use of a form of
federal escheat-the Trading With the Enemy Act "12 -designed to prevent
104 See, e.g., ALAsKA Com. LAws ANN. § 60-1-15 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 3443 (Supp. 1962).
lOS But see ORE. Rv. STAT. § 111.070(3) (1961) (escheat only when no other
heirs, devisees or legatees); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-43.1(b) (Supp. 1961) (same).
106 See IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-501 (1961) (five years) ; IOWA CoDE ANN. § 567.1
(1950) (twenty years). Compare KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-511 to -512 (1949) (sale
of land by probate court and distribution of proceeds to ineligible alien).
1 0 7 However, the treaties are usually more restrictive than most modem state
statutes. See Note, Property Rights of Aliens Under Iowa and Federal Law, 47
IOWA L. REv. 105, 116 (1961).
108 See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488-90
(1880).
10 9 Two major reasons have been advanced for the elimination of such statutes.
One is the desire of states to see the intention of the testator carried out as closely as
possible, and the other is the fear that such statutes would interfere with U.S. foreign
policy and embarrass the federal government in its relations with other nations. See
Note, supra note 107, at 119-20.
110 See, e.g., ARiz.. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-212(c) (1956).
111 Such a statute was first enacted in 1939 in New York and was aimed at Nazi
Germany, her allies, and conquests. See Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia
and Its Satellites To Share in Estates of American Decedents, 25 So. CAL. L. REv.
297, 298 (1952).
11240 Stat. 411 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. §1 (1958).
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property in this country from being used against the Allies in the war. A
current outgrowth has been the rash of statutes whose purpose is to prevent
property from going behind the Iron Curtain. 1 13  While some specifically
prohibit heirs in communist countries from taking, others provide simply
for the escheat of property which would otherwise descend to heirs in
nations where they would probably not receive it."14 Such language has
uniformly been interpreted to apply to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Even in the
absence of escheat statutes, some courts find no difficulty in ordering the
escheat of estates that would otherwise go to communist nations.115 They
may require the actual appearance in court of the alien heir or someone with
a valid power of attorney from the heir; 116 actual appearance is virtually
impossible and a power of attorney may be disbelieved. The court may
also disbelieve the evidence that the heirs are living, by taking judicial
notice of the communist governments' long record of deceit. These actions
can be justified on the rationales that escheat prevents the unjust enrichment
of foreign governments, and protects the security of the state by keeping
property out of the hands of our Cold War enemies.
C. Abandoned Property
A second type of escheat involves property abandoned by its owner.
Tangible property clearly lost or abandoned accounts for a comparatively
small volume of escheated property, and jurisdictions are split on whether
such property may be kept by the finder "1 7 or escheats to the state."8
Many statutes provide for the escheat of specific personalty abandoned 119
or lost, such as automobiles left on the highway, floating timber,120 or stray
113 See generally Chaitkin, supra note 111.
114 These statutes include a federal statute which empowers the Secretary of the
Treasury to determine nations to which U.S. Treasury checks may not be sent because
of the lack of assurance that the payee will receive the check. 54 Stat. 1086 (1940),
as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 123 (1958).
115 See Sobko Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 76 (Orphans' Ct 1954). The judicial policy
of impounding funds otherwise going to aliens in countries which would probably
confiscate them has been called the Pennsylvania rule, due to the relatively large
number of reported cases in that state. See Chaitkin, supra note 111, at 313-16. Five
other states also escheat such funds by court procedure, although they have few
reported decisions. Ibid. The courts generally base their holdings on the theory
that it is their duty to carry out the testator's intent to see that the money actually
reaches the beneficiaries.
116 See Estate of Kuhn, 248 Wis. 475, 22 N.W.2d 508 (1946). See also Deshko
Estate, 1 Pa. Fiduciary Rptr. 110 (Orphans' Ct. 1950).
117 See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1871 (applies only to lost, not abandoned, property,
see § 1872) ; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 134, §§ 4, 6 (1957). Generally the finder
must notify the proper authorities or attempt to locate the owner himself.
118 See Escheat of $92,800, 361 Pa. 51, 62 A.2d 900 (1949) (money found in
box escheats to state when finder disclaims interest in it). Florida compromises by
providing that half the proceeds from lumber found adrift in the sea will go to the
finder and half to the county treasurer. FLA. STAT. ANN § 706.18 (1944).
119 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. Ray. § 15-76 (Supp. 1961) (aeronautics com-
mission or policy officer may seize apparently abandoned aircraft and deduct charges;
balance escheats absolutely to state after one year).
120 See Ky. REv. STAT. § 364.020 (1962) (boat, raft or platform, or timber pre-
pared for market).
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beasts. 21 Escheat in these situations is justifiable not only to protect the
owner, but also to prevent unjust enrichment of the finder, whose connec-
tion with the property is purely fortuitous.
D. Presumption of Abandonment or Death Intestate Without Heirs
By far the most significant kind of escheat occurs when the owner of
property is presumed to have died intestate without heirs or to have
abandoned the property. In most cases, the presumption arises when the
owner cannot be found and has had no contacts with the property or the
holder, usually for a long period of time.
1. Bailments and Pledges
Some statutes provide for the escheat of tangible personalty left un-
claimed for a certain period with a bailee.122 These include items left with
jewelers and tailors,123 baggage in the possession of a common carrier,'
2 4
goods stored in warehouses,2 5 and automobiles left in garages. 26  The
statutes usually provide that the holder may sell the property at auction,'2
7
deduct his charges and sale costs from the proceeds, 2s and transfer the
balance to the state.1 29  Some statutes authorize a bank or safe-deposit
company to remove the contents of a safe-deposit box when the lessee has
failed to pay the rent for a given period.130 As in the bailment statutes,
the bank or company may usually sell the contents, deduct the rent, and
segregate the balance. After a further period, the contents are presumed
abandoned, and the balance escheats. Property pledged as security may
'12 See CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 50-6 (1958).
'2 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 50-1 to -5 (1958), as amended, §§ 50-1
to -5 (Supp. 1961). This act supplements the Uniform Act in Connecticut, which
covers primarily intangible property. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 50-1 (Supp.
1961).
= See LA. REV. STAT. arts. 9:4687-88 (1951) (unclaimed clothes at laundries,
tailor shops, etc.; escheat after six months) ; LA. REv. STAT. arts. 9:4701-03 (1951)
(goods, jewelry, etc., worth less than $10; escheat after one year).
'24 See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 50-3 (1958); MiNx. STAT. ANN. § 345.09
(1957).
2 See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 345.01 (1957).
'26 A special provision may be set forth for perishable goods, since the period
of abandonment must be very short. See CoxN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 50-1 (Supp. 1961)
(one week); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 345.02 (1957). The period for nonperishable
goods will usually be longer. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 50-2 (Supp. 1961) (six
months); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 345.02 (1957) (one year). However, these periods
represent the time after which the holder may sell the property. The balance left
from the proceeds of the sale after deduction of costs may not escheat to the state
for the usual long period. See CONN. GEN. STAT. Rxv. § 50-5 (Supp. 1961) (escheat
to state after ten years).
127 See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 345.11 (1957).
128 See, e.g., MITN. STAT. ANN. § 345.12 (1957).
'29 See, e.g., ibid.
13O See, e.g., N.Y. ABAmm. PROP. LAW § 300(1) (d) (escheat ten years after
opening box).
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also be escheated under some statutes after the secured party has deducted
from the pledge the amount of the unpaid debt.13 1 These statutes fall under
the rationales of owner protection and commerce.
2. Trusts
a. In General
Property held in a fiduciary capacity may be escheated on the same
theory as bailed or pledged property, even though legal title to the property
has passed to the fiduciary.132 The beneficial owner, rather than the legal
owner, is presumed to have abandoned it or died intestate without heirs.
Only Pennsylvania 3 3 and section 7 of the Uniform Act specifically pro-
vide for the escheat of property held by a fiduciary. Colorado has a statute
which applies only to trustees of decedents' estates, 34 and New Jersey
allows escheat of property abandoned by the "beneficial owner." 135 Several
other general statutes could be interpreted to cover trust property,136
although "title" to the property is in the trustee and he is the "owner."
The probable legislative intent was to include equitable titles and owners,
but under the general rule of strict construction of escheat statutes, trust
funds might be found exempt from escheat. However, this rule is usually
invoked for the benefit of the true owner rather than the holder.
The Colorado statute omits any standard or time limit for determining
when trust property is abandoned, but merely provides that the trustee of
a decedent's estate "may" pay the state when the property is "un-
claimed." 137 Under the Pennsylvania act, trust funds escheat when the
property is without a rightful owner, no one is entitled to the property on
the termination of the trust, the beneficiary's identity or whereabouts have
been unknown for seven years, or the property has remained unclaimed
for that period.138  Section 7 of the Uniform Act simply provides for
escheat when the trust property has been unclaimed for a certain period.
The property is "unclaimed" when the beneficial owner has not "increased
'3' See, e.g., Ky. Rnv. STAT. § 393.080 (1962).
1-2 Since the state succeeds only to the rights of the missing beneficiary, it has
only an equitable interest in the trust property. Thus, where a tenant for years
disappears, escheat of the income by the state for the rest of the period will not
injure the remainderman. However, when both the tenant for years and remainder-
man are gone, the state can escheat the legal interest directly without waiting for
the end of the term. Courts have not hesitated to give the state a legal interest when
practical. See 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 188-90 (1951).
133 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 331-401 (1958).
134 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-14-14(3) (1954) (applies only to fiduciary of
decedent estate).
135 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-13 (1952).
136 In addition, upon the death of a sole trustee intestate and without heirs, legal
title passes to the state, subject to the trust, and the courts will appoint a new trustee.
Some statutes provide for escheat in every case in which a sole trustee dies, even if
he leaves heirs, since the heirs have no particular qualification to serve as trustees.
See 5 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRusTEEs § 529 (2d ed. 1960).
137 See note 134 suPra.
's
3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 27, §§ 282, 333 (1958).
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or decreased the principal, accepted payment of principal, or income, or
corresponded in writing concerning the property, or otherwise indicated an
interest [in it] .... " All three statutes are custodial, but the Colorado
act bars all claims after 21 years. The interest on the trust res is part of
the escheatable property under the Uniform Act,'139 and probably also
under the Colorado and Pennsylvania statutes, since the interest itself is
"property . . . [held] in a fiduciary capacity" 140 by the terms of most
trusts. Protection of the owner is the most significant rationale for statutes
escheating trust funds.
b. Dissolution and Bankruptcy
Unclaimed dividends or shares of a corporation which has dissolved 141
or reorganized, or has gone through bankruptcy or insolvency, or unclaimed
assets of an individual who has gone through bankruptcy, are subject to
escheat in many states.'4 Such dividends or shares are generally con-
sidered held in trust,143 and statutes providing for the escheat of fiduciary
funds have been interpreted to include them.1' A fortiori, any general
statutes under which trust property is escheatable include undistributed
shares of dissolved or bankrupt corporations. In addition, the ten Uniform
Act states 145 and fifteen others 146 specifically provide for the escheat of
some of this property. Section 6 of the Uniform Act and three other
provisions are limited to voluntary dissolutions, 147 while three acts apply
only to involuntary dissolutions.148 Six statutes cover bank dissolutions
only, 49 one applies to fraternal or social organizations exclusively, 50 and
139 UiFo= AcT § 7.
140 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 333(a) (1958).
141 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1311 (1949). Section 1201 of the New
York Abandoned Property Law provides that when a corporation has failed to claim
its funds deposited in court for a certain period, the corporation shall be presumed
to be dissolved and no longer in existence.
3-
4 2 For a treatment of some jurisdictional problems, see Schoener v. Continental
Motors Corp., 362 Mich. 303, 106 N.W.2d 774 (1961).
143 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 281 (1953).
144 See Girard Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 367 Pa. 223, 228-32, 79 A.2d 666,
668-70 (1951).
1 4 5 UNiRFon ACT § 6.
146 ALASKA Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 57-8-11 to -12 (1949); Amc. STAT. § 67-609
(Supp. 1957) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 3-60a (Supp. 1961) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit 12,
§§ 1174-76 (Supp. 1962) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.101 (1962) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 53, § 112 (Supp. 1959); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 167, § 35 (1959) (banks);
MAss. GENr. LAws ANN. ch. 216, § 123 (1955) (other corporations and individuals) ;
MicH. Comp. LAWS § 567.22 (1948); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 294:125-27 (Supp.
1961), 395:25 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-289 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-20(p) (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1311 (1949); TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT
art. 7.11 (1956); WIs. STAT. § 186.29(13) (1961), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§186.29(13) (Supp. 1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 13-166 (1957). See also Micin.
Comp. LAWS § 567.41 (1948).
147 E.g., Michigan, cited note 146 spra.
148 Delaware, Maine, and New Hampshire, cited note 146 supra.
149 Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Wyoming, cited note 146 supra.
150 Alaska, cited note 146 supra.
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one deals only with cooperatives. 15' Five acts contain no qualification as
to the type of corporation or the kind of liquidation involved.'52 Under
the bankruptcy and dissolution statutes, property is escheatable only if the
corporation is truly dissolved, and not when a parent or other corporation
is entitled to the property.1 0 Only one statute specifically provides for
the escheat of the unclaimed assets of a bankrupt individual. 54
Dividends or deposits are presumed abandoned if not claimed within
a certain period from the final court decree, or if the owner is unknown or
cannot be found. Most of the statutes provide that the state may take
custody after a comparatively short time,155 and a few allow absolute
escheat after a brief period.156 Nevertheless, the owner protection rationale
is significant during the custodial period in most states; the holder pro-
tection rationale is also important when fiduciaries are under an indefinite
obligation to account for unclaimed property.
The same reasoning which motivates the escheat of unclaimed divi-
dends applies in the case of unredeemed cemetery certificates. One
court 157 allowed the escheat of such certificates on the theory that each
represented an interest in a specific plot of ground and a contingent interest
in the rest of the cemetery land. The court stated that the amount payable
to redeem the certificates was held in trust for the missing certificate
owners.
158
3. Trusts or Debts
Many statutes provide for the escheat of intangibles that could be
either trusts or debts, depending upon the circumstances. With few ex-
ceptions, it is not important whether the fund constitutes a trust or a debt,
provided of course that the statute does not apply only to trusts or debts.
a. Insurance Proceeds
A rather popular subject of custodial statutes is the unclaimed proceeds
of life and endowment insurance policies which have matured or termi-
nated.' 59 These funds have proved an important source of custodial
151 Oregon, cited note 146 supra.
152 Connecticut, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin, cited note 146 supra.
153 See Trustees of Transylvania Presbytery, U.S.A., Inc. v. Board of Educ.,
348 S.W.2d 846 (Ky. 1961) (upon dissolution of local church, property goes to national
church, not to state).
154 Massachusetts, cited note 146 supra.
'55 Oregon and Wisconsin both provide that the state may take the property if
unclaimed for six months after dissolution.
156 Arkansas provides for absolute escheat after one year.
357 Commonwealth v. Woodlands Cemetery Co. (No. 2), 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 548
(C.P. 1957).
158 Cf. TENT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-309 to -311 (Supp. 1962) (vacant cemetery lots
owned by person dying intestate without heirs escheat to owners of cemetery).
159 See generally Note, 35 VA. L. Rxv. 336, 343 (1949).
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revenue. °60  Pennsylvania first enacted such a statute 16 1 and, encouraged
by the Supreme Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of these
statutes,162 the Uniform Act states and eight other states followed. 63
The proceeds of life insurance policies are also undoubtedly covered by
most general escheat statutes.'6 Section 3(a) of the Uniform Act pro-
vides for the escheat of unclaimed reserves held to pay the policyholder or
beneficiaries of insurance policies which have matured or terminated. All
non-Uniform Act states have substantially the same statutes, which clearly
show a common origin with the Uniform Act. 165 All except North Carolina
require that the proceeds be unclaimed for a given period.166 Section 3(b)
of the Uniform Act and four other acts 167 provide that a policy is deemed
to be matured if it was in force when the insured reached the limiting age
under the mortality table upon which the reserve is based, unless within a
given preceding period the policyholder has taken some action with regard
to the policy or has corresponded with the company. Every statute is purely
custodial, and the person entitled to the funds may recover them at any
time from the state. 68 In addition, six states permit the insurance com-
pany, although relieved of liability by payment to the state, to pay any
claimant whose funds have been paid to the state and then secure reim-
bursement from the state.169 Owner protection is the primary rationale
behind these statutes.
160 See 1 STAN. L. REv. 342, 343 (1949). In the fiscal year 1961-1962, California
escheated about $700,000 from the unclaimed proceeds of insurance policies, see State-
ment of Receipts, Disbursements and Cash Balances-Uniform Disposition of Un-
claimed Property Act, 1961-1962 Fiscal Year, and New York took slightly over
$300,000, see New York Abandoned Property Statement, April 1, 1961-March 31, 1962.
1611 STAN. L. REv. 342, 343 (1949).
162 See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
16 3 DmL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1180-94 (Supp. 1962) ; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 175, § 149A (1959); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1053 (5) (b) (8) (Supp. 1961); NEV.
Rrv. STAT. §§670.180 to .300 (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:34-49 to -58 (Supp.
1962); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 700; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-23.1 (1960); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 461-73 (1958); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-238 to -249 (Supp.
1962).
164 See Lapland v. Stearns, 79 N.D. 62, 79, 54 N.W.2d 748, 758 (1952) (applying
what is now N.D. Rnv. CODE § 54-01-02 (1960)).
165 Every statute except that of Michigan contains some Uniform Act pro-
visions almost verbatim. For example, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 462 (1958) and
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-239 (Supp. 1962) are identical to § 2(a) of the Uniform Act.
166 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1181 (Supp. 1962) (seven years); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-241 (Supp. 1962) (ten years).
167 The Massachusetts statute differs from the Uniform Act in two important
respects. It applies only to life insurance companies doing business in the state, and
it omits the provision that the insured must have been absent for a certain period
before the policy can be deemed matured. Of course, the period must still elapse
between the time maturity is presumed and the time the state can take the funds. See
MAss. GiuN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 149A (1949). The other three statutes also apply
only to companies doing business in the state. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1181 (Supp.
1962); NEV. REv. STAT. § 690.200 (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-23.1 (a) (1960).
168 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §468 (1958); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-247
(Supp. 1962).
169 DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 12, § 1187 (Supp. 1960) ; MAss. GENq. LAWS ANN. ch.
175, § 149D (Supp. 1962) (insurance company must defend suit by claimant in order
to be entitled to reimbursement) ; Nxv. REv. STAT. § 690.250 (1961) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:34-53 (1963) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-23.1(g) (1960) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-245
(Supp. 1962).
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b. Unclaimed Funds With Public Utilities
The escheat of unclaimed funds in the hands of public utilities at pres-
ent is relatively unimportant both in the extent of legislation 170 and in the
amount of revenue.171 The New York Abandoned Property Act 172 and
section 4 of the Uniform Act, adopted in all Uniform Act states 173 except
California 174 and Connecticut, 75 provide that any unclaimed "deposit
made by a subscriber with a utility to secure payment for . . . utility
services", "sum paid in advance" for such services, or "sum which a
utility has been ordered to refund" is presumed abandoned. 176 In three
other states, unclaimed refunds for overcharges also pass to the state,
177
although there is no provision for the escheat of deposits or advance pay-
ments. In most states, however, public utilities may keep unclaimed
deposits or overcharges, either by express provision or mere silence. The
leading rationales for the escheat of deposits and advance payments are
owner protection and public protection, by discouraging public utilities from
170 Only fourteen states provide directly for the taking of such funds. In some
states, overcharges may in effect escheat under a procedure whereby the entire amount
of a judgment must be paid into court and unclaimed court funds escheat to the state.
171 In two of the most active escheat states, New York and California, the amounts
recovered for the fiscal year 1961-1962 were only $70,619.96 and less than $5,000.00,
respectively. See N.Y. Abandoned Property Statement, April 1, 1961-March 31,
1962; California Statement of Receipts, Disbursements and Cash Balance-Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 1961-62 Fiscal Year. Nothing was recovered
from public utilities in Nevada. See Letter From Francis P. Finnegan, Legal Re-
search Assistant, Department of Attorney General of Nevada, to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 18, 1962.
172 N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAw § 400. The usual New York provisions for reports,
publication of notice, and payment to the state comptroller follow this section. N.Y.
ABAND. PROP. LAw §§ 401-03.
17 3 The only substantive difference in the statutes is the length of the period
during which the amount must be unclaimed in order to raise the presumption of
abandonment. ARiz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 44-354 (1956) (seven years); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 717.05 (Supp. 1962) (fifteen); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 141, § 104 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1962) (seven) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-22-5 (Supp. 1961) (ten years for deposits
and advance payments and seven for refunds); ORE. REv. STAT. § 98.316 (1961)
(seven) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-44-4 (Supp. 1961) (three) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.5
(Supp. 1962) (seven); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.28.100 (1961) (seven). The
Virginia statute is applicable only to deposits made after 1961, apparently in deference
to the fact that many utilities probably have transferred old deposits from the deposit
liability account to a general asset account. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.5 (a)
(Supp. 1962). The Florida act adds a provision that "any sum paid to a utility
for a utility service, which service has not, within fifteen years of such payment, been
rendered" shall be presumed abandoned, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 717.05 (Supp. 1961). This
provision is probably superfluous, since such a sum is included in the phrase "any sum
paid in advance" for utility services.
174 See CAL. Cirv. PROC. CODE §§ 1500-27.
175 See CONN. GEN. STAT. Rxv. §§ 3-56a to -75a (Supp. 1961).
176 See UNiFoRm AcT § 4.
177 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 115-8-1 to -4 (1954) (escheat to municipality or
county commissioners; three-year limit on recovery by claimants) ; Nay. REV. STAT.
§ 704.550(8) (1961) (absolute escheat two years after final order for refund) ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 125 (1953) (absolute escheat after two years). The Colorado
Supreme Court recently held that the Colorado statute does not constitute a special
law conflicting with the general escheat act. People ex Tel. Dunbar v. People ex rel.
Denver, 141 Colo. 459, 349 P.2d 142 (1960).
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extracting large deposits. Unclaimed refunds resulting from overcharges
are escheated to prevent the utility's unjust enrichment through illegal
rates. 
1 7 8
c. Gambling Proceeds
Only four states provide for the escheat of unclaimed winnings on
pari-mutuel tickets, 179 and none appears to have influenced the others in
the terms of the statute, although the peculiar nature of state policies in
regard to gambling lead to certain common features. They all tend to be
especially stringent; the period from the date of the race until the winnings
are presumed abandoned is comparatively short-it varies from 130 days 18 0
to two years.' 8 ' Louisiana cuts off the ticket-holder's right after 120 days-
even before the state can escheat.'8 2 The Florida law specifically declares
a public policy of possessing all unclaimed winnings and, in contrast to the
usual view, states that the law is to be liberally construed. 83 Michigan
provides that a violation of the statute constitutes a misdemeanor.
84
Nevertheless, all the acts except that of Louisiana are purely custodial.'8 5
The rationale of these statutes is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the
track operator from a socially undesirable activity.
d. Corporate Stock and Dividends
A surprisingly minor type of intangible property, insofar as legis-
lation '8 6 and revenue ' 8 7 are concerned, is unclaimed corporate stock and
dividends. 188 Section 5 of the Uniform Act provides for the taking of
178 See Murdoch v. Pennsylvania R.R., 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 573 (C.P. 1958)
(customers' deposits with railroad escheated under fiduciary statute); State v. At-
lantic City Elec. Co., 23 NJ. 259, 128 A.2d 861 (1957) (5-to-2 decision). The
majority and dissent in the latter case merely disagreed over whether a debt or
trust was created. The majority stressed the facts that interest was paid and that
the deposits were commingled with other funds, while the minority noted that the
consumers never intended to "loan" the company money and emphasized the fact
that the utility carried the deposits as a liability indefinitely and repaid claimants at
any time.
17 9 The states are Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Michigan. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 550.164 (1962); Ky. REv. STAT. § 393.095 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. § 4:163
(Supp. 1962); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.967(1) (Supp. 1961); Mic. STAT. ANN.
§18.967(4), (7) (1957).
180See LA. REv. STAT. § 4:163 (Supp. 1962).
181 See Ky. REv. STAT. § 393.095 (1962).
' 8 2 LA. REv. STAT. § 4:163 (Supp. 1962).
18 3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 550.164(1) (1962).
18 4 MICE. STAT. ANN. § 18.967(7) (1957).
185 See, e.g., MicE. STAT. ANN. § 18.967(1) (Supp. 1961).
186 Only the Uniform Act states and six other states escheat such property by
specific provisions. See, e.g., TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a(1) (b) (Supp.
1962).
187 See Note, Escheat of Corporate Dividends, 65 I-Av. L. REv. 1408, 1416 n.48
(1952).
188 For a discussion of the jurisdictional problems involved, see Note, 65 HAv.
L. REv. 1408 (1952) ; Note, 27 IND. L.J. 113 (1951).
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"stock or other certificate of ownership," dividends, "or other sum held or
owing by a business association for or to a shareholder" or other security
holder, "who has not claimed it, or corresponded in writing with the business
association concerning it" within a certain period "after the date prescribed
for payment or delivery." 189 New York also has a separate escheat
provision for unclaimed stock and dividends; 190 Hawaii, 191 Kentucky,192
Massachusetts, 193 and New Jersey 194 include stock and dividends among
other intangible personal property in their general custodial statutes.
None of the statutes contains special procedural provisions for stock and
dividends. 95 The main rationale of these provisions is owner protection.
All escheat statutes declare that "increments" or "accretions" on the
property also escheat, but in State v. United States Steel Corp.,196 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that such a term does not include dividends on
stock, since a dividend represents a claim separate from the stock itself.
Therefore, the state cannot take dividends until unclaimed for the full
statutory period from the time they are declared, and they cannot be taken
along with the stock when the stock has been abandoned for the period.
197
While a dividend is an independent debt of the corporation and may be
assigned by the shareholder independently of the stock, he is unlikely to
neglect his claim to the stock for several years and yet assign his dividend
rights in that stock. The dividends can reasonably be presumed abandoned
when the stock has been unclaimed for the requisite period, even though
the dividends have just been declared. The New Jersey court's interpreta-
tion imposes on the state the burden of either taking each dividend in a
separate proceeding or waiting until the period for the last dividend expires,
foregoing the use of the revenue until then. 98 The United States Steel
holding does not, however, render the accretion clause superfluous, 199 since
the clear implication of the court's premise that a dividend is a separate
claim from the stock is that an increment, such as interest, which does not
constitute a right independent of the fund on which it accrues, would be an
"accretion." A contrary result was reached in Kennedy v. Gatz,20 0 where
an heir claimed an estate which had escheated because of an apparent failure
of heirs. The heir recovered stock in the custody of the state but not the
189 California omits "stock or other certificate of ownership" and thus applies
only to dividends and other items of distribution. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1504.
190 N.Y. ABAND. PRop. LAw §§ 500-03.
191 HAWAiI Rrv. LAWS §§ 235-15, 235-21 (1955).
192 Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 393.090 (1962).
193 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 200A, § 5 (Supp. 1961).
194 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:37-29 to -44 (1952).
195 See, e.g., Ky. Rav. STAT. § 393.020 (1962); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
200A, § 5 (Supp. 1961).
196 12 N.J. 38, 95 A.2d 734 (1953) (4-to-3 decision).
197 Id. at 47, 95 A.2d at 738-39.
198 See State v. United States Steel Corp., 12 N.J. 38, 49-50, 95 A.2d 734, 739-40
(1953) (dissenting opinion).
199 Id. at 49, 95 A.2d at 740 (dissenting opinion).
200194 F. Supp. 795 (D. Alaska 1961).
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dividends declared after the decedent's death, on the ground that the
Alaska statute did not allow a claimant to recover increments on the
escheated property.
A corporation probably cannot evade the escheat law merely by mailing
a check to the stockholder, and the New Jersey Supreme Court has held
that payment by check does not, absent an agreement to the contrary,
constitute payment of the dividend until the check is cashed.20 ' Ordinarily,
the shareholder has a cause of action against the corporation on the under-
lying obligation to pay the dividend despite the mailing of the check, and
the state succeeds to the shareholder's rights. However, Arizona has
modified its Uniform Act by exempting dividends for which a negotiable
instrument has been issued and "delivered." 202 If delivery is interpreted
to include actual receipt by the stockholder, this presents little problem;
otherwise it provides a means to avoid the statute.
A special problem is created by the payment to a record owner, such
as a broker or dealer,2 03 who is not the beneficial owner. The corporation
clearly has nothing the state can escheat, and the state will have to pursue
the broker. Section 5 of the Uniform Act probably is not intended to
cover unclaimed dividends held by brokers for customers, and Utah has
added to section 5 of its act a provision for the taking of such dividends. 20 4
Nevertheless, these dividends can be caught by other provisions, such as
section 7 of the act.
e. Unclaimed Funds Held by the Government
Although few states have them, 205 provisions for the escheat of un-
claimed funds in the hands of government organs and officials are par-
ticularly desirable.20 6 Unlike private individuals or corporations, public
agencies cannot transfer funds to which some person is entitled into their
general funds, or use such funds for their general expenses, without statu-
tory authorization. Section 8 of the Uniform Act and a North Dakota
statute 207 provide for the escheat of property held by a public corporation,
public authority, or public officers of the state.208 Such provisions present
little difficulty, since they merely call for a transfer of the unclaimed funds
201 State v. United States Steel Corp., 12 N.J. 38, 95 A.2d 734 (1953).
202 Az. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 44-355 (1956).
203 See Note, 65 HAxv. L. Rzv. 1408 (1952).
204 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-44-5 (3) (Supp. 1961).
205 These consist of the Uniform Act states and the states whose acts are cited
in notes 207-08, 210, 215-17 infra.
o20 Possibly a number of states provide for the transfer of private funds from
one department into the school fund or general fund of the state, but do not call the
procedure "escheat," although it is an escheat in effect.
2 0 7 N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-01-02.1 to -02.3 (1960).
208A few states have specific provisions for the escheat of property held by an
arm of the state. See HAWAII Ry. LAWS § 12S-46 (1955) (surplus after tax sale
shall escheat if unclaimed for ten years) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95Y/, § 7-503 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1962) (escheat of securities deposited by motor vehicle operator after
accident and unclaimed for more than three years).
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from one arm of the state to another; in North Dakota, for example, the
unclaimed funds merely pass into the general fund of the taxing district
represented by the holding officer or agency.
20 9
Six states have enacted special provisions for the escheat of unclaimed
funds held by state institutions for patients or inmates who have left the
institutions.210 These funds may be property held by the patient when he
enters the institution or money deposited by relatives for his care and not
exhausted. Without a special statute, such funds would be escheatable
under statutes covering the estates of those who die intestate without heirs
only if the law of that state governed the distribution of the estate. Since
an institutional inmate may be domiciled elsewhere, the statute of distribu-
tion of the state where the institution is located would often not govern such
estates. Moreover, it is possible that the inmate's state of domicile may
claim the property held by the out-of-state institution under the former's
statute of distribution. Were the owner protection rationale the basis for
these statutes, it might be better to allow the domiciliary state to hold the
property; presumably an heir would be more likely to seek property there
than in the state where the decedent was institutionalized. However, these
statutes are justified under the moral obligation rationale, thus giving the
state of the institution a superior claim to the property.
Three states escheat only the unclaimed funds of inmates of certain
specific institutions, 211 and the other three cover all state institutions.
Four statutes apply only to deceased inmates, one to deceased and
escaped,2 13 and one to deceased and discharged.214 There is no good
reason to restrict the act to deceased inmates only, unless the legislature is
unwilling to declare a presumption of abandonment.
The Uniform Act states and six others 215 provide for the escheat of
unclaimed moneys held by a court. 216 The only major problem in this area
involves state escheat of funds held by federal courts. Several states
specifically provide for the escheat of such funds,2 17 but others apparently
209 N.D. CENT. CODE§ 54-01-02.3(a) (1960).
210 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 965.08(4) (Supp. 1962) ; IowA CODE ANN. §§ 218.67 to .68
(1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 45 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.060 (1962);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-15-16 (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-2-11 (1956).
211 Maryland (state hospital or training school); Missouri (institutions for
mental diseases); and North Dakota (soldiers' home).
212 Florida, Iowa, Missouri, and North Dakota.
213 Maryland.
214 Rhode Island.
215 DE .. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1160-63 (Supp. 1962) ; HAWAII REv. LAWS § 235-10
(1955); MicH. Comp. LAWS § 567.21 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 470.270 to .350
(1956); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW §§600-03; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §334 (1958).
216A few states also provide for the escheat of specific types of funds held by
courts. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. art. 15:26.2 (Supp. 1962) (escheat to parish of
money used as evidence in criminal cases and not disposed of within five years).
Unclaimed alimony payments have been escheated in Michigan. See Pokorny v.
County of Wayne, 322 Mich. 10, 33 N.W.2d 641 (1948).
217 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-822 (1955) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.9 (Supp.
1962).
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exclude them. It is debatable whether the phrases "court in the state" 21 8
or "court of this state," 219 as used in the Uniform Act,220 would include
federal courts. Section 8 of the Uniform Act is entitled "Property Held
by State Courts . . . ." Thus, the term as used there probably excludes
federal courts, and two of the Uniform Act states have inserted a reference
to federal courts. 22 1 The New Jersey Superior Court has held that a
provision excluding "personal property in custody of any court in this
state" from the coverage of the escheat statute did not exclude property
in the custody of the federal courts, since the purpose of the provision was
merely to exclude types of property subject to other escheat statutes.22
This conclusion, however, was based more on the legislative policy of
escheating all possible property than on the specific wording of the
statute.22 When the statute purports to escheat all property held by courts
in the state, the legislative policy indicates an intent to escheat funds in
federal courts. If the phrase "courts in this state" does not cover federal
courts, the phrase "courts of this state" certainly does not.
f. Miscellaneous
Under general escheat statutes, some states have taken or attempted
to take other types of property which could be considered either trusts or
debts. A number of states have escheated unclaimed wages,22 4 and New
Jersey, a particularly imaginative state, has escheated sums withheld from
the salaries of former company employees for the purchase of United States
bonds which amounted to less than the price of one bond.225  Owner
protection is given as the main rationale.
Pennsylvania also has been active in the escheat field. In the famous
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania22 6 case, the state court had held
telegraphic money orders escheatable when neither addressee nor sender
could be found,227 and the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute.
5. Debts-Bank Deposits
Bank accounts constitute the only important kind of escheatable in-
tangible which is almost universally recognized as a debt. Except for
estates of persons dying intestate without heirs, unclaimed bank deposits
218 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 345.08 (Supp. 1962).
219 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-2711 (1951).
220 UNFoRm AcT § 8.
221 UTAHI CODE ANN. § 78-44-8 (Supp. 1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.9 (Supp.
1962).
222 State v. Gallaher, 44 N.J. Super. 59, 129 A.2d 593 (Ch. 1957).
=23 See id. at 65, 129 A.2d at 596.
224 See, e.g., State v. United States Steel Corp., 12 NJ. 51, 95 A2d 740 (1953).
See also Ky. REv. STAT. § 413.460 (1962) (escheat of unclaimed deductions for pur-
chase of government bonds from salaries of state employees who have left office).
225 See ibid.
226 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
227 Commonvealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 400 Pa. 337, 162 A.2d 617 (1960).
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are the type of property most commonly covered by specific statutes. 2 2
Thirty states provide for the taking of inactive bank deposits,22 9 and general
provisions in two other states apparently encompass bank accounts.2 30
Only Arkansas specifically prohibits the seizure of bank accounts,2 31 al-
though the cryptic Georgia provision also clearly excludes them.
232
Section 2 of the Uniform Act, a typical provision, states that deposits
in a banking organization or funds paid toward the purchase of shares or
other interest in a financial organization are presumed abandoned when
the owner has not done any of the following for a given period: increased
or decreased the amount of the deposit, presented the passbook or other
evidence of deposit for the crediting of interest, corresponded in writing
with the organization concerning the funds or deposit, or otherwise in-
dicated an interest in the deposit as evidenced by a memorandum on file
with the organization. The dormant period in the Uniform Act is only
seven years, but most statutes provide for an unusually long period.
Of the thirty specific bank deposit statutes, only North Dakota's
contains no provision for the recovery of funds by the owner,233 although
228 Early statutes were often limited to this kind of property. See Garrison,
Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35 Ky. L. REv.
302, 307 (1947).
2 2 9
ALASKA Comp'. LAws ANN. §57-8-8(a) (Supp. 1958); ARiZ. Rzv. STAT.
ANN. § 44-352 (1956) ; CA.. FIN. CODE § 874; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 3-57a (Supp.
1961) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1170-73 (Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 717.03
(Supp. 1962) ; HAwAI REV. LAws §§ 235-11 to -12 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-502
(Supp. 1961); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 393.060 to .080 (1962); LA. Rxv. STAT. art
6:164-66 (1950); LA. Rv. STAT. art. 9:1587 (1950) (pertaining to New Orleans
transactions only); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 1-0, 120 (Supp. 1961) ; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 11, §§ 46, 206 (1957) (latter section apparently repealed former by impli-
cation, see Opinion of Attorney General, Daily Record, Aug. 31, 1951) ; MAss. GEN.
LAWs ANN. ch. 200A, §§ 3-4 (1955); Micfr. Comp. LAws §§ 567.11, 567.15(b), (d)
(1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.522 to .524 (1946 & Supp. 1962); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §386:24 to :30 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:9-18 to -940 (1963); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §22-22-3 (Supp. 1962); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW §§300-03; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 116-24 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-24.1 (Supp. 1961); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 98.306, 120.120 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 241-301 (1958); R.I. GEN.
LAWs ANN. §§ 19-11-9 to -13 (Supp. 1962) ; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b
(Supp. 1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-44-2 (Supp. 1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 851-63 (1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.3 (Supp. 1962); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 63.28.080 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 220.25 (1957).
280MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §91-502 (Supp. 1961) (failure of title presumed
when owner missing for twenty years and property unclaimed; real or "personal
property" may escheat); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §271 (1951) (seven years'
absence raises presumption of death intestate without heirs, and real or "personal
property" may escheat). The term "personal property" undoubtedly includes bank
deposits. See Allen v. Barnett, 186 Ark. 494, 496, 54 S.W.2d 399, 400 (1940) (inter-
pretation of statute) ; Estate of Northcutt, 16 Cal. 2d 683, 107 P.2d 607 (1940) (will
construed so as to prevent partial intestacy) ; Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. South
Carolina Tax Comm., 233 S.C. 129, 150, 103 S.E.2d 908, 918 (1958) ("personal
property" includes deposits in building and loan associations).
The Commissioner's note to section 2 of the Uniform Act reports that 36 states
have legislation "designed to capture dormant bank deposits"; this statement probably
indicates a somewhat broader interpretation of some statutes than the author would
make.
2 3 1 AYax. STAT. ANN. §50-603(c) (Supp. 1961) (abandoned property shall not
include bank deposits).
=2. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1101 (1955) (escheat on failure of heirs and in no other
case).
233 See N.D. REv. CODE § 6-08-24.1 (Supp. 1961).
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two other states sharply limit this right.2 3 4 Five states allow a claimant to
recover within a specified time only,235 and the remaining twenty-two are
purely custodial.
23 6
E. Property Ownerless by Operation of Law
In addition to provisions against alien inheritance, several states forbid
aliens to hold property, particularly land, acquired in any manner.237 The
rationales of these statutes are the same as for the statutes prohibiting alien
inheritance. The usual provision prohibits aliens or foreign corporations
from holding title to land in the state. Aliens acquiring land in enforcement
of a lien generally have a certain time within which to dispose of it. The
statute may require the alien himself to dispose of the land within a certain
time, or it may provide for immediate seizure of the land with full com-
pensation to the alien.23 3 The present trend is toward repeal of these
statutes.
&2 39
A number of statutes prohibit a corporation from holding more land
than is necessary and proper to its corporate function.2 4° Corporations are
often forbidden to acquire farm land, and the land holdings of tax-exempt
institutions may be restricted.
Some statutes provide for the escheat of property which is illegal per se.
Such property consists of objects whose predominant use is illegal and
2 3
4 In Alaska, only owners of seized funds of not more than $1,000 can reclaim
those funds; a provision that the refund procedure shall not be construed to deprive
the claimant of any other remedy allowed by law apparently confers no right on
claimants of more than $1,000, particularly since the statutes provide no other remedy.
See AIAsKA Comn. LAws ANN. § 57-8-8(b) (Supp. 1958). Maine renders refund
completely discretionary by making the exclusive procedure one of petition to the
governor and council. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, §§ 1-0, 120 (Supp. 1961).
=3 5 HAWAIi REv. LAws § 235-13 (1955) (five years) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 48.527
(Supp. 1961) (forty); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 386:28, 395:25 (1955) (fifteen)
(the former section provides that the "disposition!' of deposits shall be the same
as the disposition of unclaimed dividends of insolvent institutions; "disposition"
probably includes the latter section, a refund provision, despite § 386:30, which
provides a special procedure for reclaiming escheated bank deposits but mentions no
time in which such claim must be brought); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 301 (1958)
(ten) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 220.25(5) (d) (1957) (five).
236 These consist of the ten Uniform Act states and the following: DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1144(a), 1146 (Supp. 1960); Ky. REv. STAT. § 393.140(2) (1959);
LA. REv. STAT. art 6:165 (1950) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, § 206(c) (1957) ; MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 200A, § 101 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1053(53) (Supp.
1961) ; N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 1406; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-24 (1960) ; R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 19-11-12 (Supp. 1961); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b(g)
(Supp. 1962) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 855-58 (1958).
237 See, e.g., Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 381.300 (1959) (right to escheat eight years after
alien acquires title).
238 See NE. Rxv. STAT. § 76-408 (1958).
239 Idaho requires appearance of nonresident aliens within two years after the
death of the decedent. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-116 (1948).
240 See Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.145 (1959). The corporation may be required to
dispose of the land within a certain time itself, see ibid., or the state may seize it and
dispose of it.
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includes certain narcotics and gambling devices.2 41 The state usually cannot
sell or auction such property, since no one could legally purchase it; and
its only recourse is to destroy it.
A few statutes provide for the escheat of property acquired illegally.
Idaho prohibits the acquisition of electric utility property by anyone other
than an electric utility, and provides for the escheat of property held in
violation of this provision. In some cases public utility refunds may con-
stitute property illegally acquired, and some statutes provide for the escheat
of refunds from companies other than public utilities.242  In Missouri,
unclaimed refunds resulting from unreasonable fire insurance rates are
escheated.
243
The rationale of escheat as punishment for violation of law remains
in statutes which provide for the seizure of property illegally used, although
the property itself is neutral. For example, Ohio provides for the taking
of a gun, boat, trap, or other device used to take wild animals in violation
of the game laws.
244
Service to the lord is of little importance today, but there are situations
in which land is ceded by the state on the condition that the grantee make
some particular public use of it. For example, a Delaware statute provides
that land ceded to the United States for the construction of an aid to
navigation shall escheat unless building is begun within two years and
completed within ten.
2 45
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion indicates the inadequacy of one general
escheat statute for all types of property. Specific provisions are essential
to give recognition to the various rationales for escheat, and the varying
constitutional standards which apply to escheat of different types of prop-
erty. In drafting a comprehensive escheat act, legislators must first decide
what circumstances will support a reasonable presumption of abandonment
in each case. Four separate groups have some interest in most unclaimed
property: the owner, the holder, the public (represented by the state), and,
when the property in question is a share of some larger fund, the persons
who own the other shares in the fund. Their interests, which often conflict,
must be weighed to reach a just result in each case.
2 41 The rationale for the confiscation of such property is so different from that
for the taking of unclaimed property that the Arizona Supreme Court has held that
a statute entitled "Relating to Unclaimed Moneys or Property in the Hands of
Public Officials" fails to give notice that it contains a provision for the seizure of
slot machines. In re Twenty-One Slot Machines, 72 Ariz. 408, 236 P.2d 733 (1951).
242 Cf. State v. Goodbar, 297 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. 1957), in which illegally collected
excess insurance premiums were taken under a statute providing for the escheat of
unclaimed court funds.
243 Mo. STAT. ANN. § 379.395 (1949).
244 OnIo Rzv. CODE § 1531.13 (1954).
245 DEL-. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 103(c) (1953).
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MODERN RATIONALES OF ESCHEAT
Legislators are inclined to accord the greatest weight to the state's
interest and thus overstress the revenue rationale because of their duty
to raise money for the state. When they decide not to escheat a certain
type of ownerless property, they must rely on other sources of state revenue,
especially taxes, for the money that would otherwise come from escheated
funds. It may be more just to take property from those who do not own it
than to raise taxes applicable to all, including those who have not benefited
from windfalls. However, the revenue from escheats is uncertain and may
fluctuate widely; and some of the funds taken under custodial acts must
be reserved for payment of claims. Furthermore, the legislature can
accomplish a policy of imposing a heavier burden of support on persons
who do not earn or give consideration for their property by the simple
expedient of a high tax on ownerless property, or a tax measured by the
amount of ownerless property received by the taxpayer. Indeed, this tax
might extend to the full value of the property escheated. The distinction
between escheat and taxation in such a case is not merely semantic. The
tax would be paid in money, so the holder might keep the ownerless per-
sonalty and still pay the state. Under escheat statutes, either all of the
abandoned property must be taken or none of it; no rationale justifies the
seizure of only a portion of the ownerless property. However, a windfall
tax would avoid both Scylla and Charybdis and give effect to otherwise
conflicting state policies. The portion taken would tend to satisfy the
rationales in favor of escheat, while the portion retained would help meet
the interest of the holder and possible reasons for permitting him to benefit
from abandoned property. In particular, a tax rather than escheat will
avoid the confusion resulting from the current tendency to invoke every
rationale but the revenue rationale as a basis for legislation which in
practice is passed only to obtain revenue.
The owner protection rationale is probably the most important today,
and it should be recognized whenever possible by adopting custodial statutes.
The same considerations behind statutes of limitations should determine
the period after which the right of recovery is cut off. An unintentional
extension of the statute of limitations is especially undesirable in the
custodial statutes.
In the rare situations in which the holder would want the state to
escheat--cases in which the holder protection rationale is important-the
state should almost invariably do so. The holder obviously has no claim
to the property, and furthermore the involuntary holder will tend to relax
his efforts and diligence in the management of the property.
Thus, a comprehensive statute should provide for each specific situation
in which property shall escheat, in order to allow for differing circumstances
and to make the legislative intent plain. The statute should also enumerate
the circumstances under which ownerless property, constitutionally escheat-
able, will not escheat. The catch-all provision should not merely state that
all other abandoned property shall escheat, but should set forth the legisla-
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tive standards by which the courts can determine whether property not
specifically mentioned in the statute shall escheat.
The second major concern of legislators is to prevent the ownership
of certain kinds of property by particular owners. It is important that
legislators frequently review escheat by operation of law statutes to see
whether they should be revised in light of changing facts and state policies.
In particular, the question of whether estates may go to heirs behind the
Iron Curtain calls for a legislative, not a judicial, determination. This
hinges on questions of fact as to the practices of foreign governments and
as to U.S. foreign policy, which can best be ascertained by means of the
legislative machinery.
Each state should reexamine its escheat legislation in the light of the
current rationales. Although the revenue rationale has been discounted
somewhat in this Note, a statutory revamping would probably increase
escheat revenues, since many new types of property could be included.
Individual rights would undoubtedly be accorded greater respect, since
the interests of the holder, other claimants, and the owner would be con-
sidered. Escheat has reached a stage of development where it cannot
afford to remain a feudal vestige with haphazard modern trappings, the
sole function of which is to fill the state's coffers.
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